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ABSTRACT
This research aims at testing the effects of ownership structure 
on efficiency of various organizational forms: privately-owned 
regulated electric utilities (PR), publicly-owned electric utilities 
(PU), and consumer-owned cooperative electric utilities (CO).
Because of the attenuation of their structure of property rights 
and high enforcement costs, it is expected that all three organiza­
tional forms (PR, PU,( CO) will show some level of inefficiency. 
However, it is more difficult to establish which organizational 
form will be most efficient since all aspects of property rights are 
qualitative in nature. CO is expected to be more efficient than PR 
and PU since it shows: (a) more homogeneity of interest among
principals; (b) more Individual ownership claim over the assets; (c) 
a simpler political market (efficiency as the main issue of concern, 
and election every year); (d) a stronger monitoring structure when 
the control activity of the Rural Electrification Administration is 
considered. PU and PR cannot be discriminated and are expected to be 
as (in)efficlent.
The methodology used to test for efficiency differences requires 
the selection of an appropriate estimator (stochastic frontier 
model), an objective function (cost minimization), and a functional 
form to capture the characteristics of technology (Cobb-Douglas 
production function) from which we can derive the economic models to 
be estimated (long and short run cost functions and a system of 
equations). Such a methodology is appropriate since it provides us 
with an absolute measure of mean technical and allocative efficlen-
vii
cles for each ownership structure considered. Those models are 
estimated using MLE and Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm using data 
measured at the plant level from steam generating electric utilities.
The essential idea behind the stochastic frontier model is that
the error term is composed of two parts: a symmetric component that
permits random variation of the frontier across firms, and captures 
the effect of measurement error, other statistical noise, and random 
shocks outside the control of the firm; and a one-sided component 
which captures the effect of technical inefficiency relative to the 
stochastic frontier. Measures of allocative efficiency can be 
obtained from the residual of the first order conditions from cost 
minimization.
Results from estimation of those models indicate that: (a) all 
three types of ownership structures suffer from some degree of 
inefficiency; (b) estimations of long run models rank CO as the
most efficient ownership structure; the difference between CO vs PR 
and PU is important and statistically significant, moreover, measures 
of inefficiencies of PR and PU are not significantly different; (c) 
estimation of short run models produces ambiguous results; the
stochastic frontier short run cost function puts PR as the most 
efficient ownership structure while the system of equations shows 
identical inefficiency measurement for PR and CO with PU having the 
highest level of Inefficiency; (d) total inefficiency is composed 
mostly of technical inefficiency for PR, PU, CO; (e) when efficiency 
measurement is compared for small and large plants, total inefficien­





Over the last 20 years economists have been increasingly focusing 
their attention upon the nature of the firm. Even though most econo­
mists are basically familiar vith the classical textbook definition 
of the firm> the renewed attention towards the nature of the firm 
brought into light concepts such as property rights, contracts among 
agents, transaction costs and efficiency. Alchian and Demsetz in 
their seminal paper (1972) argued that the ownership structure 
characterizing the entrepreneurial firm is endogeneous and has 
emerged to minimize the shirking problem facing all teams of produc­
tion because of the transaction costs encurred to guarantee that 
contracts among parties involved will be respecte*. However, numerous 
types of organizations emerge and survive in market economies; aside 
from the traditional firms (the entrepreneurial firm), one can find 
modern corporations, multinational firms, regulated private firms, 
various types of partnerships, cooperatives, non profit organiza­
tions, publicly-owned firms, etc.. Very little is known about the 
nature of those firms; that is, how do they fit within the competiti­
veness of market economies, and more specifically, how does their 
structure of property rights relate to various measures of efficien­
cy? Large sectors of the economy are characterized by the presence of 
different ownership structures, the agribusiness industry and the 
banking industry, for example, are two Important sectors where 
private firms (often regulated) and cooperative firms compete with
each other on a large scale. Other sectors such as transportation, 
telecommunications and energy are characterized by the presence 
of public firms, private firms and cooperatives. Since most econo­
mists would argue that the economic system alms at an efficient 
allocation and use of scarce resources, the comparative efficiency of 
various organizational forms is an important issue to be considered 
since they are characterized by a different structure of property 
rights. This structure is thought to be related to efficiency since 
it affects the incentives to allocate resources to their most 
productive use, and the extent of exchange taking place in the 
economy.
The electric industry offers interesting features with respect to 
the central issue of this research. This industry encompasses several 
ownership types: private utilities (regulated), cooperatives, federal 
systems, and municipal utilities. The relative importance of each 
ownership type is as follows: the privately owned electricity 
generation accounts for approximately 77% of the total net generation 
In the United States compared to the publicly owned electricity 
generation which accounts for 21% of the total net generation, and 
less than 3% for the rural electric cooperatives (Sowell, 1978, p. 
1). The importance of those ownership types varies with respect to 
the segment of the Industry under scrutiny, but only the generating 
segment is of interest to us in this research. The primary energy 
sources for generating electricity are: coal (45%), oil (17%), gas 
(18%), hydro (15%), nuclear (5%) (Scott, 1976, p. 24). Only the 
conventional steam-electric power plants burning coal, oil, or
natural gas to produce heat which is used in converting water to high 
pressure steam will be considered. These fossil-fuel steam-elec­
tric plants dominate power production in the industry, and contribute 
to approxlmatly 80% of the total generation (Scott, 1976, p. 27). All 
ownership forms operate fossil-fuel steam-electric plants. Moreover, 
data on those plants are readily available and published yearly 
by the Federal Power Commission.
The central issue of this research is the comparative efficiency of 
various ownership structures. That issue will be addressed using the 
electricity industry because of the range of ownership types produ­
cing electricity using the same technology; each ownership type 
operates a sufficiently large number of plants to allow statistical 
analysis to be conducted.
There have been few studies to date which addressed this issue of 
cost difference between ownership structures in electric Industry. 
Meyer (1975), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980), Dilorenzo and Robinson 
(1982) all estimated a cost function with a dummy variable accoun­
ting for ownership structure. Their results indicated that publicly 
owned electric utilities were more efficient than privately-owned 
electric utilities. Using a different methodology, a non-frontier 
cost function, Sowell (1978) concluded that private utilities were 
more efficient than public utilities. All those studies show methodo­
logical limitations; the use of a dummy variable model is based on 
the concept of an average function which does not represent the most 
efficient technology; it measures a combination of random shocks, 
technical and allocative Inefficiencies, and it is not capable of
discriminating between them; furthermore, it implies that one of the 
ownership forms considered is efficient. Sowell's research concluded 
on comparative efficiency based on a comparison of average and 
marginal costs calculated for each ownership structure. His results 
are questionable since he did not control for technology differences 
across ownership types. Furthermore, they are contradictory since 
he claimed that both ownership forms showed duality between produc­
tion and cost function (Implying a cost minimizing behavior), but at 
the aame time they showed allocative inefficiency.
The attenuation of the structure of property rights of each 
ownership structure along with their Incentive and enforcement costs 
of monitoring is discussed in chapter two. The empirical models 
estimated on plant data from the electric utility Industry, and used 
to measure and compare efficiency of those ownership structures are 
discussed in chapters three and four. They are comprised of : (1) a 
stochastic frontier function; (2) a functional form characterizing 
the underlying technology using a Cobb-Douglas production function;
(3) an objective function characterizing the behavior of the various 
organizational forms where all organizational forms are assumed to be 
cost minimlzers; (4) the models to be estimated which are a long run 
and short run production and cost functions; (5) the estimation 
is done with numerical techniques using MLE and Davidon-Fletcher-Po- 
well algorithm. Such a methodology is appropriate because it provides 
estimates of absolute measures of technical and allocative ineffi­
ciencies for each organizational form. Results on measures of 
technical and allocative efficiencies for each ownership structure
are presented in chapter five. Our results Indicate that all three 
organizational forms are inefficient to a certain degree. Furthermo­
re* most models estimated Indicate that cooperatives are most 
efficient compared to private regulated and public utilities. 
Differences, over mean inefficiency, among public and private 
regulated are not statistically significant. Moreover, estimates of 
total inefficiency are mostly comprised of technical inefficiency 
rather than allocative inefficiency.
The choice of an appropriate methodology to addr.ess this issue is 
of great importance. Among the models available, and reviewed in 
chapter three, we have selected the stochastic frontier model. From 
such a model, which can be used with a limited number of functional 
forms encompassing a production function, cost function as well as a 
system of equations, we derived information on absolute measures of 
technical, allocative and total cost inefficiencies for each owner­
ship structure. Moreover, those estimates of various measures of 
inefficiencies have statistical properties allowing to test their 
statistical significance.
The debate over the efficiency of various organizational forms in 
the electric industry has been going on for almost a century. In 
1907, the committee on Public Policy of the National Electric Light 
Association reported that:
«the subjects of municipal ownership and public regulation 
and control of public utilities are intimately connected 
with each other. Neither can be adequately discussed without 
reference to the other. Indeed, one is the alternative to the 
other. Municipal ownership is demanded largely because of the
absence of proper public regulation and control. Public 
regulation and control, if efficient, removes the necessity 
or excuse for municipal ownership by securing fair treatment 
for the public (Heilman, 1982, p. 13).»
The performance of the electric power industry is still very much a 
controversial issue:
«fifty years ago vigorous debate centered on whether the 
role of government in this industry should be increased, 
with public enterprise, replacing regulated private enter­
prise. Currently, in the wake of deregulation in other 
sectors of the economy, a central issue is whether the role 
of government in electric power should be reduced, with 
market forces replacing government regulation as the 
guarantor of acceptable industry performance (Joskow and 
Schmalensee, 1985, p. 5).»
Therefore, the analysis of the efficiency of the different organiza­
tional forms ought to be very Important for policy matters.
SECOND CHAPTER
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCENTIVE STRUCTURE, AND EFFICIENCY
1- Introduction
Two key demands are placed on economic organizations to be effi­
cient (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972 p. 778):
(1) metering Input productivity
(2) metering revards
A specific reward system is needed to stimulate a particular 
productivity response. The property rights approach focuses on 
such a system of penalty-reward and its link with efficiency.
In the electricity generating industry we find three different 
types of organizational forms: the privately-owned electric utilities 
(PR), the publicly-owned electric utilities (PU), and the consumer- 
owned cooperative utilities (CO). Those various organizations can be 
distinguished on the basis of their property rights structure. 
Incentives of different parties involved; owners, customers, politi­
cians, managers, input owners (other than stockholders), have to be 
assessed in relation with each given property rights structure.
Enforcement is crucial to link a specific system of property 
rights, and incentive, to a particular productivity response. 
High enforcement costs result in departure from the productlon- 
possibility and utility-possibility frontier (Pejovich, p. 344).
A proper definition and a presentation of the content of property 
rights is given in the second section of this chapter. In the third
section we focus on the specific penalty-reward structure attached 
to each organizational form Identified in the electricity generating 
industry. A comparison of those structures will be conducted on the 
basis of:
(1) their property rights (attenuation of),
(2) the incentives of the various parties Involved,
(3) the monitoring activities required to assure the respect of 
these rights (enforcement),
(4) the impact of the attenuation of property rights on efficiency. 
Finally, a comparison of the various penalty-reward and their 
enforcement activities, will be conducted on the basis of their 
impact on efficiency.
2- Definition of property rights
Property rights can be defined as the effective right to do things, 
and the effective claim to rewards as a result of this action 
(Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972 p. 342). Three elements are recognized 
as characterizing the content of property rights:
(1) the right to use the asset (usus); i.e. exclusivity,
(2) the right to appropriate returns from the asset (usus fructus).
It is the user's right to appropriate yield from an asset, and 
to bear the consequences from changes in the value of an asset, 
but not to sell or to change its qualities; i.e. appropriabili­
ty*
(3) the right to change the asset's form and/or substance (abusus).
It implies the right to legally transfer all rights; i.e.
transferability.
Enforcement costs are crucial in establishing exclusivity* appro­
priability and transferability of property rights. Therefore, the 
costs of negotiating, contracting and enforcing the exchange are an 
important characteristic of property rights.
Since every contract means an exchange of some bundle of property 
rights, the attenuation reduces the set of opportunity choices of the 
contracting parties and affects the allocation of resources.
Attenuation interferes with two major propositions in economic 
theory:
(1) scarce resources tend to be allocated to those uses where 
they are expected to be the most productive,
(2) the extent of exchange depends upon the initial amount of 
goods in the possession of individuals and their marginal rates 
of substitution.
The definition of property rights has focused on its content, its 
fundamental characteristics, its attenuation with respect to the main 
propositions of economics, and the costs of enforcing those rights. 
The next section will focus on those aspects of the definition with 
respect to the entrepreneurial firm as a polar case, the privately- 
owned electric utilities, the publicly-owned electric utilities, and 
the consumer-owned cooperative electric utilities.
3- Description and comparison of various property rights structures.
In the property rights approach, attention is concentrated on the 
objectives of the various Individuals involved in the organization. 
Different structures of property rights will lead to different 
penalty-reward, and hence determine the choices that are opened
10
to decision makers. 1 An analysis of Che various structures of 
property rights requires both a definition of the utility function 
that reflects the preferences of the decision makers, and the actual 
set of options that are attainable by the decision makers.
The comparison of various structures (the entrepreneurial firm Is 
added as a polar case) requires that we Identify the different 
principals and agents Involved in the decision making process, and 
establish their incentives^. The incentives of each principal and 
agent will have to be described with respect to the penalty-reward 
attached to each structure of property rights. The incentives will be 
influenced by the different attenuations of the property rights. 
Those attenuations will characterize the organizations as a limiting 
factor for the principals and agents in the pursuit of their own self 
interest. They will also affect the enforcement costs of property 
rights, allowing agents more room for discretionary behavior.
3.1 Entrepreneurial firm (polar case)
We classify the entrepreneurial firm as a polar case because it 
is thought to have none of the attenuations on property rights that 
affect the other three organizational forms (PR, PU, CO).
The firm, which is perceived as a nexus of contractual arrange­
ments between input owners, is characterized by a non separable
^Jensen and Meckling (1979, p. 472) state that the production of the 
firm will depend on the specification of rights and laws or rule of 
the game governing contracting. The relevant aspects of the contrac­
ting and property rights system within which the firm operates, 
play an Important role in motivating self-interest to achieve the 
physically possible output.
^An agency relationship is defined as: a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308)
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production function. With positive transaction costs (the cost of 
detecting, policing, monitoring and measuring Input performances) 
each Input owner will be Induced to take more leisure time than when 
these costs are zero. Because of positive transaction costs, shirking 
becomes a viable activity.
Alchlan and Demsetz (1972, p. 782) argue that the entrepreneurial 
firm, with its specific bundle of property rights, arises as a 
response to reduce shirking by constraining input owners to respect 
the terms of their contracts with the central party (the entrepre­
neur) , who specializes as a monitor to check the input performances 
of the team members. To assure that the central party performs his 
monitoring task without shirking, he will be allowed to:
(1) measure input performance,
(2) apportion rewards,
(3) appropriate the net earnings of the team, net of payments 
to other inputs.
(4) terminate or revise contracts among input owners participa­
ting as team members.
The content of the property rights structure of the entrepreneur­
ial firm can be rewritten with respect to the definition given in the 
previous section. The entrepreneur holds an exclusive right to use 
the assets since he represents the central party common to all input 
owners. He holds full claim on rewards by being allowed to appropria­
te the net earnings of the team, the residual. Finally, he holds full 
transferability rights since he can revise or terminate contracts 
among Input owners. All fundamental characteristics of property 
rights are present in entrepreneurial firms: (1) exclusivity in the
12
use of the Inputs, (2) appropriability of rewards, and (3) full 
transferability of those rights. The property rights structure 
characterizing the entrepreneurial firm Is said to be complete.
The different parties involved with the entrepreneurial firm 
include: risk bearers (stock owners), managers, other input owners 
(labor, leased equipments, borrowed capital, etc.), customers^. The 
two functions of the central party, risk bearing and management 
of resources, are fulfilled by the entrepreneur^ who will seek to 
maximize his objective function. Other input owners will also seek to 
maximize their own objective functions which are different from that 
of the management and risk bearer^. Their objective functions 
may Include non pecuniary goods such, as on the job consumption of 
leisure time and respect as well as monetary Income. This Implies 
agency costs in carrying out the contracts agreed upon among input 
owners.^ Non pecuniary income consumed by the agent, but not agreed 
upon by the principal in the contract, reduces profits of the
^Customers are considered since they contract with the central party 
to buy output from the team of production. By seeking to satisfy 
their own interest they will play a central role in the overall 
incentive structure of the entrepreneurial firm.
^The management represents the one party who is common to all the 
contracts of the joint inputs, and who has the right to renegotiate 
any input's contract Independently of contracts with other Inputs. 
The risk bearer holds the residual claim and has the right to sell 
his central contract and his residual status owner. (Fama, 1980 p. 
288)
Sjensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) state that: if both parties of 
the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interest of 
the principal .
6Je nsen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) state that: it is generally
impossible for the principal or the agent to ensure, at zero cost, 
that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal's 
viewpoint .
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entrepreneurial firm affecting the oppportunity set of the principal. 
The monitoring activities? are required to enforce the bundle of 
property rights attached to the entrepreneurial firm. The principal 
(the entrepreneur) will enforce his rights to maximize utility up to 
the point where marginal gains of monitoring equals marginal costs of 
such activities. He derives his incentive to carry his monitoring 
activities from his full exclusivity, appropriability and transfe­
rability over the assets.
In the following sections, it will be shown that all attenuation
of rights will reduce rewards that can be appropriate from monitoring
and may increase the costs of monitoring. The results will be a set 
of expectations regarding the relative efficiencies of various 
organizational forms.
3.2 Privately-owned regulated electric utility (PR)
Property rights of the PR are attenuated because this organiza­
tional form shows separation of ownership from control. The risk
bearer keeps the right to appropriate the net earnings as well as the 
right to sell all those rights. However, managers are given the 
rights, by the principals, to measure input performance, apportion 
rewards, and revise or terminate contracts among contracting parties. 
This attenuation reduces the ability of the owners to control the 
decisions made by the managers. Further attenuation results from the 
extensive regulation to which PR is subjected.
Each utility has been granted a monopoly franchise to construct 
facilities and provide power to a specified service territory. In
^Monitoring of contract agreements can be performed directly through 
budgets, policies, operating rules, ect.. It can also be performed 
indirectly through various input and product markets.
return for this monopoly power, utilities have ceded to regulatory 
authorities control over entry and exit from the business, over the 
rates that can be charged to consumers and over the amounts of 
profits that can be earned. This regulatory authority is exercised at 
two levels; the wholesale market, or sales between utilities, and the 
retail market, or sales to ultimate consumers. In general, federal 
authorities regulate the wholesale market, and the states regulate 
retail rates (Fenn, 1984, pp. 12-14). All activities of PR electric 
utilities outside federal jurisdiction are subject to state regula­
tion. This regulatory authority is generally assigned to a state 
public service or public utility commission. At present, 11 states 
have elected utility commissions, while the others have appointed 
commissions. In addition to authority over retail rates, most state 
utility commissions have the authority to: (1) initiate financial and 
management audit, (2) set company performance standards, (3) esta­
blish automatic rate adjustment mechanisms, (4) and provide for 
consumer representation during regulatory proceedings. Many also have 
jurisdiction over such matters as accounting procedures, mergers and 
dispositions of property, financing arrangements, power plants 
and transmission line siting and utility expansion plans (Fenn, 1984, 
p. 14)
Property rights of PR are affected by regulation. The exclusive 
use of the assets is being attenuated through the obligation to 
operate as a franchised monopoly and to meet demands in legally 
defined service territories. It also is attenuated by the regulation 
over wholesale sales and power pooling arrangements. Price regulation 
affects the right to appropriate returns from the assets. Transfers-
bility is also affected since decisions about plant expansion, type 
of generation or merger, are subject to regulation. Those attenua­
tions affect the owner's expectations about the use to which he can 
put the assets since they make it more difficult to reallocate 
resources to more productive uses. They also affect the value of the 
assets to the owners. Finally, they create limitations on the 
owner'8 right to change the form, place or substance of an asset, and 
to transfer all of his rights to others at mutually acceptable 
prices.
The different parties involved with the PR are: risk bearers 
(stock holders), consumers, managers, other input owners (labor, 
leased equipments, borrowed capital, ect.), commissioners and 
politicians. Each of those parties will be maximizing its own utility 
function subject to the organization as a limiting factor. The 
attenuated property rights structure means that stock holders have 
limited rights over the assets because of regulation and separation 
of ownership from control. The regulatory commission may hold a large 
share of the property rights; and voters (consumers) control those 
rights through the political process, therefore, becoming one of the 
principals, along with the stock holders.
The overall structure of incentives is influenced by all these 
contracting parties. Stock holders are motivated by profits, but 
regulation limits their return on Investment to a fair rate of 
return. The incentives of stock holders are reduced to zero after 
rate of return becomes effective since increased efficiency on the 
part of team members could not be appropriated or transferred. 
Consumers are interested in minimum prices and Increased efficiency
in Che use of resources. Their marginal gains from increased effi­
ciency is therefore positive. Managers are influenced by the perfor­
mance of the firm since it can be correlated to their opportunity 
wage. The evaluation of their performance can be accomplished 
indirectly by the managerial market, and directly by the board of 
directors. However, after the rate of return is effective, managers 
can appropriate potential profits at zero cost to stock holders. 
Managers are induced to consume non pecuniary goods such as larger 
staffs, larger gross assets, luxurious offices, less efficient but 
more desirable employees, etc.. Such consumption goes against the 
objectives of the principals since it deviates from the pattern that 
would ensure profit maximization or cost minimization. Managers may 
also lobby members of the regulatory commission about what are 
prudent costs, enhancing their potential consumption of non pecuniary 
goods. Only consumers would be affected. Non-capital input owners 
will also seek to maximize their own objective functions, which may 
be different from those of the managers or owners. On the job 
consumption may be included in their objective functions and attenua­
tes tie exclusivity and appropriability terms of the contract agreed 
upon by the parties. Politicians can also have their opportunity wage 
influenced by the performance of PR to the extent that it is recogni­
zed that they are not properly performing their task as monitors. But 
it will be even more difficult to correlate performances of politi­
cians to this single efficiency issue. Therefore, assuming effective 
rate of return regulation, incentives for efficiency will depend 
mostly on the consumers.
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The enforcement of the contracts among the team members is done 
by the principals (stock holders, consumers) over the agents (politi­
cians, commissioners, managers), by the agents (politicians, commis­
sioners) over the managers, and by the managers over the other 
Input owners.
Stock holders have a strong Interest In the existence of a finan­
cial market which prices the firm's securities efficiently. By having 
partial transferability rights over their ownership of PR, stock 
holders can indirectly monitor performances of the team of produc- . 
tion. However, regulation affects the property rights structure of 
the firm through legal restraints on the allowable magnitude of the 
residual, limiting the ability to fully capitalize the future value 
of current decisions. This attenuation of property rights reduces
I
the incentives of stock holders to monitor the performance of the 
team and to enforce the contracts among input owners and the central 
party. It also limits the efficiency of the financial market itself 
as a source of indirect monitoring. The market price for securities 
of private utilities is affected by the limitation over allowed rates 
of return. Potential expected profits of the firm would affect the 
security price under normal circumstances, but who would know if 
increased efficiency has not been pursued when profit is being 
regulated? More important, stock holders would not have any incentive 
in further specializing as monitors since they have no possibility of 
appropriating expected profit from such activities after the allowed
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rate of return has been pald.& Voters (consumers) will indirec­
tly control the performance of the team of production using the 
political process. By electing politicians who are committed to cost 
efficiency, voters can influence the decision process of the regula­
tory commissions. However, because of the free rider problem consu­
mers are expected to shirk their task of becoming well informed 
with respect to efficiency of electric utilities and performance of 
politicians, and there may be less than socially optimal monitoring 
on their part. A final source of indirect monitoring comes from the 
managerial labor market. The performance of managers can be linked 
to their opportunity wage through the managerial labor market. 
However, the capacity of managerial labor market in evaluating 
performance of managers should be impaired the same way the financial 
market is; how do we know if managers are not performing optimally 
after rate of return regulation has been reached. Therefore, even 
though managers may not be seeking profit maximization or cost 
minimization it is unlikely that their opportunity wage will be 
affected.
Direct monitoring will be performed by the board of directors 
elected by the stock holders. They will directly evaluate the 
performance of managers in carrying out the contracts among input 
owners. The incentives of the board are likely to be the same as
®We could envision the cost of monitoring the performance of the team 
as being function of the efficiency of the financial market until the 
allowed rate of return has been reached. After that point there is an 
expected increase in monitoring costs since information over poten­
tial increased efficiency has no value to stock holders and is not 
likely to be accounted for by the financial market. Interested 
parties would have to rely on direct monitoring to find out about 
potential increase in efficiency not captured by the team of product­
ion.
Chose of the stock holders, and they are likely to be limited the 
same way. Therefore, stock holders will tolerate discretionary 
behavior on the part of management since it is virtually costless (to 
managers and stock holders) to transfer potential profits over and 
above the allowable rate of return. Stock holders will monitor 
managers to the point where marginal costs of monitoring equals 
marginal gains of such activities. After the allowable rate of return 
has been paid, marginal gains to stock holders virtually fall to zero 
while the marginal costs Increase because of the limitations imposed 
on the indirect monitoring activity performed by the financial 
market. The regulatory commission will also be directly monitoring 
the performances of the production team. Their incentives come 
from the political process. They may have access to some of the 
information that the board of directors has, information that 
managers have to provide by law and when asked for it. But it is 
unlikely that they would have as much information on the private­
ly-owned utility than the board of directors has, since the regulato­
ry commission is specifically asking for information when it is 
conducting hearings while the board is actively involved in the 
operations of the PR. Furthermore, it is not in the best interest of 
the PR to provide more information than is required by the regulatory 
commission. However, the possibility of comparing the performances of 
various utilities allows for the indentificatlon of sources of
Inefficiencies at low cost.9 Finally, managers will be monitoring 
activities of other members of the team. Regulation allows more 
freedom for managers to have discretionary behavior as long as they 
perform well enough to pay the allowed rate of return. Other sources 
of monitoring, such as direct market competition, are not likely to 
be of much help since private utilities are franchised monopolies. 
Furthermore, the possibility of a take over should be limited since 
the Federal government regulates such activities. However, potential 
competition may be a positive force.
In conclusion, attenuation of property rights of PR affects the 
incentive structure by reducing potential marginal gains of the 
principals and agents involved as well as Increasing the enforcement 
costs. When rate of return regulation is effective, Incentives of 
stock holders fall virtually to zero. Appropriability of consumers is 
attenuated. Furthermore, consumers have to face high enforcement 
costs to appropriate residuals (cost of production - minimum cost of 
production) since they have to rely on two sets of agents to do so. 
Finally, the regulatory commission is arbitrating among various 
interests of consumers, stock holders and managers, further increa­
sing the enforcement costs of consumers to appropriate more residuals 
in the form of reduced prices. Consumers have almost no transferabi­
lity other than reducing the amount of electricity bought. Only stock
^Joskowand Schmalensee (p. 21) state that: The availability of such 
comparative statistics could make regulation more effective. And if 
the regulatory authorities made extensive use of such comparisons, 
this form of competition could represent an important implicit source 
of rivalry between monopoly firms. Despite the prominent role that 
yardstick competition has long played in discussions of public policy 
toward electric power, until recently regulatory agencies do not 
appear to have made much use of comparative information.
holders can transfer claims over the assets of PR. Therefore* 
attenuation of property rights affects the efficiency of indirect 
control since the financial and managerial markets will be less 
effective after rate of return regulation has been reached while the 
political market may produce less than optimum monitoring because of 
the free rider problem. Since regulation eliminates much of market 
competition* there may be less indirect monitoring by potential 
competitors than for the entrepreneurial firm. Efficiency of direct 
monitoring is also likely to be affected since the board of directors 
has reduced incentives to further control activities of managers 
while the regulatory commission is likely to intervene at times of 
hearings and based on informations mostly given to them by the 
managers of PR.
3.3 Publicly-owned electric utilities (PU)
Municipal systems are usually run by the local city council or an 
independent board elected by voters or appointed by city officials 
(Fenn, 1984, p.10). Some of the state commissions are empowered to 
regulate municipal electric systems. However, they usually do not 
exercise all their powers over municipal systems because of inadequa­
te staff and funds and the willingness to invade the autonomy of 
municipal governments (Power committee, 1948, pp. 425-426).
The PU shows separation of ownership from control, but contrary 
to PR, further attenuations of its property rights are not caused by 
regulation. The main difference comes from the fact that ownership is 
obtained with residency. Voters cannot buy or sell portions of stocks 
in the government; i.e. transferability of ownership cannot be done 
through the financial market. Residents who want to sell their shares
22
of Che utilities have to migrate from the area, reduce their quantity 
of input bought, or sell the entire utility to a third party. 
Transferability of ownership (to a third party) could be translated 
in terms of reduced taxes or allocated to other uses within the 
municipalities. Transferability is further affected by the limited 
rights of owners to sell their assets; they cannot directly sell 
their claims on future cash flows. Even though the residual is 
likely to be zero by law, the potential gains from increased effi­
ciencies are the reduced costs to residents, so appropriability of 
rewards from actions that would lead to increased efficiencies are 
well identified. Moreover, price of electricity is likely to be 
charged close to its cost, so that consumers would notice the impact 
of improved efficiency. Appropriability is limited since residents 
can benefit from increased efficiency only proportionally to their 
level of transaction with the utility. Only if they benefit from 
the assets for a sufficiently long period will they be able to 
appropriate future expected benefits from current decisions.
The different parties involved with the PU are: owners/users 
(residents), politicians, managers and other input owners. As before, 
each of those parties will be expected to maximize its own objective 
function. The incentives of the residents are derived from the use 
of electricity. Users would benefit from a price reduction following 
an increase in efficiency of the production team. Since politicians 
are elected to efficiently allocate resources in the public domain, 
the inefficient use of public resources is likely to reduce their 
chances of being reelected. Moreover, like managers and the manage­
rial labor market, politicians who are not seeking reelection have to
consider the possibility that their opportunity wage would be 
affected by bad performances as managers of public resources. 
Managers of PU may have much the same objectives as their counter­
parts in PR, where pecuniary as well as non pecuniary income enter 
their objective function. As in the PR, attenuation of property 
rights allows them discretionary behavior, such as larger staff, less 
productive but more desirable employees, larger assets, etc.. 
Attenuation reduces potential penalties for not seeking more effi­
cient projects, for not monitoring other input owners properly, etc.. 
Potential penalties come from evaluation of their performance by 
politicians and residents, and from possible impact of bad perfor­
mances on their opportunity wage. Other input owners also have 
pecuniary as well as non pecuniary goods entering their objective 
functions and therefore, can be expected to shirk on the terms of 
the contracts among parties.
The overall structure of incentives derived from the property 
rights of PU is towards increased efficiency because of user/owner 
objective of cost minimization. However, attenuated rights of these 
principals allow some discretionary behavior on the part of the 
agents, politicians, managers and other input owners; so deviations 
from the patterns of cost minimization are to be expected.
The enforcement of the contracts among the team members is done 
by the principals (residents) over the agents (politicians, mana­
gers), by tbe politicians over the managers, and by the managers over 
the other input owners. Indirect monitoring by the residents will be 
performed using the political system. By electing politicians, who 
nominate directory board members, committed to efficiency in the use
of resources, voters will indirectly monitor the activities of the 
team of production. In order to perform their monitoring task 
properly, voters need to know about preferences of politicians over 
efficiency issues. Furthermore, they need information about the 
relative efficiency in PU; i.e. in producing electricity in order to 
evaluate the performances of politicians. Because politicians are 
elected over a wide variety of issues, they will unlikely monitor 
utilities perfectly. Furthermore, the free rider problem suggests 
that voters are likely to shirk their task of being well informed on 
preferences of politicians or on politicians' records with respect to 
efficiency of electricity generation. Indirect monitoring by resi­
dents can also be performed by observing areas serviced by other 
utilities.
Politicians and the board of directors of the PU will be directly 
controlling the activities of managers. Information will be obtained 
from the management and other input owners; but compared to regula­
tors of the PR, politicians and directors may not have as much 
information about several utilities. However, just as in the case of 
the PR they may have Information coming from potential competitors. 
Unlike the regulatory commission, the board of directors of the PU 
will be actively involved in supervising activities of managers, and 
they will have to consider interests of the consumers.
The managerial labor market will control managers to the extent 
that their performance affects their opportunity wage. But there is 
no reason to expect that managerial labor markets will pressure 
managers of the PU any more than those of the PR.
In summary, important aspects of the property rights structure
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are attenuated, thus affecting the incentive structure dominated by 
consumers' objectives. Because of limited appropriability and 
transferability, consumers cannot expect full rewards from actions 
that would enhance efficiency. Rights are further limited by the 
enforcement structure. The political system is likely to be ineffi­
cient with respect to utility alone since politicians can shirk their 
task of monitoring efficient use of resources within PU. They are 
elected over many issues and for a four-year period. Furthermo­
re, voters are likely to shirk their task of being properly informed 
about such issue as efficient electricity production.
3.4 Consumer-owned cooperative utilities (CO)
The rural electric cooperative is an incorporated association of 
neighbouring farmers and other rural residents, organized democrati­
cally for the purpose of supplying electricity to its members at the 
lowest cost made possible through mutual self-help and the Rural 
Electrification Administration's (REA) financing and guidance. 
Electric cooperatives are almost entirely financed by the federal 
government who closely supervises and assists the establishment and 
the operation of their businesses (Power committee, 1948, p. 451). 
The contract, which governs the relations between the REA and the 
cooperative after the system is in operation provides REA with the 
needed information to supervise all major aspects of the operating 
policy. Operations are supervised through ten (10) regional supervi­
sors, and co—ops must submit annual and monthly operating statements 
and statistics. The REA has no congressional mandate to regulate the 
retail rates of cooperatives, but the cooperatives must charge rates 
sufficient to pay taxes, maintenance costs and other operating
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expenses, Co meet principal and interest charges when due, and to 
provide a reasonable reserve for working capital. In practice, REA 
virtually determines the retail rate policy of the cooperatives 
(Power committee, 1948, p. 455). In most states, cooperatives are not 
subject to state authority (Power committee, p. 460).
Therefore, a cooperative is a non-profit economic entity, usually 
found operating at the retail level which is owned and managed by its 
customers. While cooperative members hold shares in their cooperati­
ves, these shares do not generate dividends for profit, but are 
reinvested into the operation of the business as patronage capital, 
which is often credited to individual members. Cooperatives operate 
on a one-person, one-vote basis and the members elect directors from 
their own ranks' (Doyle, 1979, p. 2). The rural electric system 
is a two level operation, comprised of some 980 local distribution 
co-ops and approximatly 60 generating and transmission co-ops 
(G+T's). Local co-ops distribute electricity to their own rural 
customers, while G+T's generate and/or transmit electricity primarily 
for local distribution co-ops, which are typically members of a 
G+T's or a co-op federation (Doyle, 1979, p. 15). Co-op democracy is 
a representative democracy, and at each level of co-op decision-ma­
king, the local co-op is represented by one of its board members or 
its directors. Local co-ops have typically at least one of their 
board members on the boards of the state rural electric association 
and the G+T system to which they belong (Doyle, 1979, p. 203)*0.
l°Doyle goes further by saying that many of the local representa­
tives on the G+T boards depend on the G+T staff expertise and 
management assessements of policy issues to help them decide how to 
vote at boards' meetings (1979, p. 203).
Cooperatives are private organizations with open membership. 
However, ownership of a cooperative is related to the usage of its 
services. An ownership share is paid in part with an initial fee 
called social share. Further investments are made through undistribu­
ted residuals; patronage capital on which members have individual 
claims. This additional investment is related to the transactions 
made by the members with the CO.
Even though there is no financial market for claims of the 
cooperative shares, which will limit transferability, members have a 
claim on cash flows contingent on being a user and they can appropri­
ate expected increased efficiency through reduced price of electrici­
ty. Appropriability over the cash flows of the CO. covers the full 
price paid for electricity as well as the residual which is a 
percentage over operating prices until all costs are accounted for. 
Appropriability is limited to the level of transactions between the 
cooperative and its members. Because ownership is limited to one 
share, members cannot expect to appropriate (full) rewards from 
actions that would result in increased efficiency. However, appropr­
iability is further attenuated because members will not be able to 
bear the consequences of changes of forms and substances of the 
assets, and the future consequences of improved management will not 
be directly capitalized into present wealth of claim owners although 
they may be capitalized into other assets, such as land values. 
Unless they remain members long enough to use up the assets, they are 
expected to suffer from the horizon problem related to their expected 
termination (i.e. migration) date (as owner of a claim over the cash 
flow of the co-op). Finally, the role played by the REA, even if it
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does not have a congressional mandate to regulate the rural electric 
cooperatives, attenuates appropriability since It virtually determi­
nes their retail rate policy. Ownership claim, comprised of a social 
share and the patronage capital credited to members, can only be sold 
back to the cooperative at nominal value, which attenuates transfera­
bility over claims owned by members. The absence of financial market 
forbids transfer of rights at market value. When members transfer 
their ownership claim to the coop, they can act merely as consumers. 
Transferability is further attenuated since the co-op cannot change 
the form and/or substance of its assets without approval by the REA.
The principals for the CO are the members, and to a certain 
degree the voters since the Federal government (representing the 
voters) finances almost entirely their operations. The contract which 
governs the relations between the co-op and REA covers all aspects of 
their operations. The agents are the board of directors, the managers 
and the REA officers (representing the Federal government). The 
incentives of the members are derived from the use of electricity. 
Cost of production will directly enter their objective function, as 
will the size of the residual that can be distributed at the end of 
the year. The board of directors consists of members as well, so they 
should have much the same incentives as the members themselves. Aside 
from the social value of the rural electrification program, voters 
ought to be concerned with respect to the possible default in 
cooperative loans since the Federal government is responsible for 
almost all the money borrowed by the co-ops.
Managers and other input owners may have the same objective 
functions as the managers of the PR and PU. The incentives influen­
cing managers are related to their expectations with respect to their 
opportunity wage determined In the managerial labor market. They are 
also induced to consume non pecuniary goods as were managers of PR 
and PU utilities. Bureaucrats from the REA agency also have an 
objective function in which enters pecuniary as well as non pecuniary 
income since they are managers for the Federal government.
The incentives derived from the co-op's property rights structure 
are based on both electricity prices and potential residuals. Claims 
over the assets, even though limited, will also influence members 
since they can withdraw from the co-op and expect to be bought off. 
The REA supervises the activities of the co-ops in order to reduce 
risk of bankcruptcy. Their incentives might lean more toward suffi­
cient revenues than minimum costs. Indirect control over the activi­
ties of the team of production is rather limited. Since there is no 
market to exchange the assets of the CO, members can only sell their 
share to the co-op itself, or migrate. In the absence of migration 
they still would have to buy electricity from the co-op since it is 
most likely to be a franchised monopoly within a specific territory. 
Since cooperatives are not regulated, members cannot delegate 
indirect control of agents to politicians. They could sell off the 
assets of the CO and divide the proceeds among themselves. Members 
elect directors annually at a general assembly. They indirectly 
control the agents by delegating their responsablllty to the direc­
tors. Therefore, indirect monitoring is performed by a political 
system where the politicians (directors) are elected every year over 
a single issue; efficient allocation of resources. This may be a 
major difference with respect to PU. Direct control is performed
mostly by directors who oversee the performance of managers. Informa­
tion comes from the production team. The board may not have as much 
comparative information as the regulatory commission, though informa­
tion is available via the Federal Power Commission and the Rural 
Electric Administration, but like the PU it has inside information 
with respect to the activities of managers. Furthermore, direct 
monitoring is performed by the bureaucrats of the REA who have 
extensive powers over the operations of the co-ops. REA has informa­
tion on a large number of utilities. The role played by the REA, as a 
monitor, is a major difference between the CO vs the PR and the PU.
In conclusion, attenuation of property rights affects incentives 
of consumers; appropriability is limited to the level of transactions 
of members with the co-op, furthermore, it is limited since members 
cannot appropriate expected future residuals unless they remain 
consumers long enough. Transferability is limited by the absence of 
financial market and the obligation to sell off claims over the 
assets of CO to the co-op at nominal value. Incentives of members are 
centered on reduced prices. The role played by the REA is important 
and will enhance the incentive structure of the co-op. Indirect 
monitoring takes place through the political market; this political 
market is private since CO have open membership with democratic 
representation. Board members are elected over a single issue every 
year and control the activities of the CO directly. Monitoring is 
also performed by the REA on a regular basis. The role of REA both in 
the incentive structure (as lender) and the monitoring structure 
seems to be a major difference with respect to PR and PU.
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4~ Comparison of efficiencies of organizational forms (PR, PU, CO)
4.1 Meaning of Efficiency 
Efficiency is a complex concept:
«i£ is a statement about the performance of processes 
transforming a set of inputs into a set of outputs. It is a 
relative concept since the performance must be compared to 
a standard*.
This standard will be strongly influenced by the characteristics of 
the technology including all feasible physical possibilities. The 
characteristics underlying a technology are best represented by:
(1) the scale effect; the relative increase in output as all 
Inputs are increased proportionally. The technology can show 
increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale. If the 
marginal rate of technical substitution between Inputs 
remains unchanged as output increases with input proportions 
constant, we have a homothetlc technology.
(2) the substitution effect; the degree to which inputs can be 
substituted for one another. It refers to the shape of the 
Isoquants.
(3) the expansion path; it is defined as the locus of cost-mi­
nimizing input combinations in input space for a given set of 
input prices.
(4) the technical change; it is generally recognized that the 
production technology changes over time. Technical change 
will shift the production function, and the nature of the 
shift will determine whether it has a neutral or non-neutral
^Forsund and Hjarmarsson (1974, p. 141)
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effect on the Inputs of the production process. A non-neutral 
change means that one or more of the factor inputs has become 
disproportionally more productive than the remaining inputs.
The concept of technical change requires a distinction between ex 
ante and ex post technologies. The ex post technology represents a 
specific technology in place, while the ex ante technology represents 
the set of all available blueprints for equipment of different 
design characteristics prior to installing a new piece of equipment. 
The technical change is said to bet embodied when only the new 
equipment can incorporate the most recent technology. It is said to 
be disembodied when technology is influenced by phenomena like 
learning by doing whereby productivity of old inputs are affec­
ted.
Establishing a meaningful hypothesis as to which organizational 
form is expected to be more efficient first requires a definition of 
efficiency. Static measures of efficiency can be divided in three 
categories:
(I) technical efficiency requires a firm to produce a maximum 
level of output from a given input bundle^. The firm will 
therefore be on its production frontier.
l^In general, two different measures of technology can be defined. 
The first measure shows the ratio between the amounts of inputs 
required to produce the observed output with frontier technology, 
and the observed amount of input. This input saving measure shows 
the relative reduction in the amount of inputs needed to produce the 
observed output, with frontier technology, using the observed factor 
production. A second measure is obtained by comparing the observed 
output with the output obtained on the frontier using the same amount 
of inputs. This output augmenting measure is the ratio between the 
observed output and the potential output obtained by employing the 
observed amounts of inputs in the frontier production. These two 
measures will coincide in the case of linear homogeneity.
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(2) allocative efficiency requires a firm to utilize its inputs 
in the right proportion, given input prices^. The firm is 
operating on its least-cost expansion path.
(3) scale efficiency requires a firm to operate at the appro­
priate scale level for a given vector of inputs^. The scale 
level is appropriate when the size of the plant shows the 
average short run cost curve tangent to the minimum point 
on the long run average cost curve.
The frontier production function corresponds to maximum output 
given by the technological possibilities at the time of installation 
of the latest equipment. It is a planning frontier, or an ex ante 
function. The actual possibilities for a plant at a given moment in 
time are determined by the vintages of all the existing production 
units. Therefore time Introduces problems in measuring efficiency in 
two ways:
(1) A plant could be designed and utilized at its inception in 
a manner in which there are neither technical nor allocative 
inefficiencies; i.e. it is on its planning frontier. At a 
later time, it could be off the current frontier for two 
reasons:
^Allocative efficiency is represented by the point of tangency 
between an Isoquant and the relevant isocost line.
l^The measures of scale efficiency refers to the output augmenting 
measure if the maximum average product is applied to the given scale, 
it refers to input savings if a given output was produced at the 
maximum average product. In order to control for technical ineffi­
ciency, those measures compare the optimal plant scale to the 
hypothetical output or input requirements if the firm was on its 
frontier. For this reason, a constant returns to scale production 
frontier would exhibit no scale inefficiencies.
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a) technical change shifted the frontier, so while the plant 
may be on its ex ante frontier, it is not on the current 
frontier.
b) factor prices may turn against the firm even if there is 
no technical change. If technology is not putty-putty it 
cannot readjust fully and allocative Inefficiency is 
observed.
(2) There may be some optimal adjustment path in response to 
changing technology and prices over time, determined by the 
firm's objective function.
Even though we can do little to control for the second problem, 
we can control for the first by considering only new plants and 
specifying vintages.^
Recognizing the characteristics of technology in the electricity 
generating industry is very important in order to be able to inter­
pret the various measures of inefficiencies. Technology used to 
generate electricity is said to be of the putty-clay type1®. This is 
important since as it is argued by Fuss and McFadden (1974 , p. 
317-318),
<in the presence of significant flexibility efficiency 
trade off, conventional econometric production functions 
provide very little information on the structure of the ex
i^Fuss and McFadden (1974) suggest estimating models of the firm in 
which an ex ante decision is made on plant design, based on expecta­
tions about the environment to be faced ex post. (pp. 320-321). This 
kind of model allows a recognition of the possibilities of a trade 
off between flexibility and efficiency.
putty-clay technology can be represented by an ex ante design that 
achieves static efficiency at some output, and fixes the quantities 
of both capital and variable inputs in the ex post technology.
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ante best practice envelope curve, and may Indeed provide 
misinformation. More fundamentally, we conclude that the 
concept of a static best practice envelope curve characte­
rizing the ex ante technology is inadequate, and In environ­
ments where firms face considerable uncertainty and intertem­
poral variation, irrelevant. It is in this case Impossible to 
define meaningful isoquants in a static picture of one-period 
production possibilities in which the flexibility-efficlency 
trade off has no explicit representation.
If such is the case, then our standard of comparison to measure 
efficiency has to be carefully interpreted even in dealing with data 
representing ex ante technology.18
In a putty-clay world where some input substitution becomes 
impossible until the next plant is built, changing prices of inputs 
will make the firm appear to be allocatlvely Inefficient. However, 
this may not be neccessarily the case. For example, we can't ignore 
the cost of adjustment. Also managers could have Included such things 
as flexibility-efficiency tradeoff in the planning frontier, or they
^Examples of f lexibility-efficiency decision in production processes 
are: (1) Electric utilities can build base load plants which have 
higher capital cost, but lower operating cost, and represent the 
lower cost technology for providing continuous output, or they can 
build peak load plants. (2) They can also build thermal plants which 
can be converted to use oil, gas or coal. These boilers increase 
capital and maintenance costs and thus result in inefficient produc­
tion if only one type of fuel is used throughout the life time of the 
plant. (Fuss and McFadden, pp.311-312)
l^since we are interested in a comparative analysis of various orga­
nizational forms, we can hypothesize that their ex ante and ex post 
environments are sufficiently comparable to allow meaningful compari­
sons. However, all comments about absolute inefficiencies with 
respect to each organizational forms have to be very carefully inter­
preted.
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may expect changes In relative prices of inputs later and plan to be 
allocatively inefficient in the early stages.
4.2 Attenuation of property rights and efficiency
As it has been stated earlier, the two major propositions of 
economic theory are: (1) resources are allocated to their most
productive use, (2) and the extent of exchange depends upon the 
initial amount of goods in the possession of individuals and their 
marginal rate of substitution. Attenuation of property rights : (1) 
affects the owner's expectation about the use to which he can put the 
asset, (2) affects the value of the assets to the owners and to 
others, and consequently the terms of trade, (3) implies the existen­
ce of limitations on the owner's right to change the form, place or 
substance of an asset, and to transfer all of his rights to others at 
mutually acceptable prices. When incentives are limited because of 
attenuation of property rights, or because of high enforcement costs, 
it is less likely that resource owners will be motivated to trade 
optimally. Property rights are defined as one's effective right to do 
things ((re)allocate resources to more productive uses), and one's 
effective claim to rewards as a result of his action (affects the 
MRSXy and therefore the extent of exchange). Attenuation of property 
rights can be translated in terms of lack of incentives to meter 
input productivity properly, or to apportion rewards accordingly. The 
absence of correlation between input productivity and rewards will 
leave the economic organization to be inefficient. High enforcement 
costs will reduce the amount of monitoring for all level of incenti­
ves from property rights, and shirking among resources owners will be 
more viable. The value of goods (function of the bundle of property
rights attached to it) will be decreased, and less exchange will take 
place.
The entrepreneur has exclusive rights to use the assets, full 
claim on rewards, and full transferability. Therefore, he has full 
incentives to monitor and to enforce contracts among members of the 
team of production. Those rights will allow the entrepreneur to 
maximize its utility function. He will enforce those rights directly 
by observing and measuring performances of members of the team. He 
will be forced to perform his monitoring task otherwise competitors 
would cease opportunities and consumers would vote him out of the 
market (or he would have to reduce the residual that he can appro­
priate after all input owners have been paid).
The entrepreneurial firm produces maximum incentives to monitor 
input performance (property rights are said to be complete) , and 
reduces the enforcement costs of monitoring those activities. Since 
entrepreneurs are utility maximizers, they will be expected to 
maximize the rewards from appropriability and transferability, 
and therefore, correlate productivity and rewards (to resource 
owners). We can expect that resources will be allocated to their most 
productive uses.
All three organizational forms presented earlier are not expected 
to be efficient since they all suffer from attenuation of property 
rights and high enforcement costs which affect the overall incentive 
structure of, the principals and agents Involved.
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4.3 Comparative efficiency of PR, PU, CO
Table 1















1) Financial market (0<z<l)










1) Board of stock holders (0«cz<l) + +
vs directors of co-ops and
directors of municipal system
2) Regulation (Regulatory + -
commission vs REA)
A comparison of efficiency of those organizational forms is very 
difficult to establish. All three forms show attenuation of their 
property rights structures which impaires their overall incentive and 
enforcement structures. From the summary table 1, it is seen that 
incentives derived from the property rights structure for CO seem a 
little stronger since members have more appropriability (the resi­
dual) and transferability (the claims over social shares and undis­
tributed residual). Looking at consumers (as principals)^, their 
incentives towards increased efficiency seem very much alike. From
l^We must recall that consumers of co-ops are also members while 
consumers of PU are also residents.
the enforcement structure point of view, CO seems to come first 
because its political market deals with a single issue while elec­
tions are on a year basis. The main advantage however comes from the 
control by the REA bureaucrats since these have to protect the 
Federal Government from Co-op's default on loans, and are doing 
so by supervising all aspects of cooperative's administration.
In concluding however, one has to emphasize the limitation of 
such comparison because of the qualitative nature of the various 
dimensions used to characterize each organizational form.
THIRD CHAPTER
LITERATURE REVIEW ON EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF EFFICIENCY
1. Introduc C ion
This chapter reviews the literature on empirical measurement 
of efficiency. Several models have been proposed to measure efficien­
cy. They can be categorized as follows: (1) deterministic non-parame- 
tric frontier, (2) deterministic parametric frontier, (3) determini­
stic statistical frontier, (4) stochastic frontier model, (5) 
non-frontier efficiency models, (6) total factor productivity, (7) 
dummy variable model. Each of those models has advantages and 
disadvantages. A discussion of those models with respect to the 
objective of this study follows in section 2 and a review of empiri­
cal results relevant to this study is made in section 3.
2. Quantitative measures of efficiencies : review of the various 
models developed and used to test and measure efficiency
2.1 Deterministic non parametric frontier 
Following Forsund et al. (1980, pp.8-9),
cFarrel's approach is non-parametric in the sense that 
he simply constructs the free disposal convex hull of 
the observed input-output ratios by linear programming 
techniques. It is not based on any explicit model of the 
frontier or of the relationship of the observations to the 
frontier*
Farrel's (1957, pp.254-255) measure of technical efficiency 
is calculated from a best practice technology one can observe. The 
efficient isoquant is derived from an efficient production function 
obtained from observations of the Inputs and outputs of a number of
firms. Each firm is represented by a point on an isoquant diagram. 
From the scatter diagram, the efficient isoquant is estimated, and 
the pairs of points chosen are those for which the line joining them 
satisfies the two following conditions; (1) the line must be downward 
sloping, (2) no observed point must lie between it and the origin. 
The isoquant represents the various combinations of the two factors 
that a perfectly efficient firm might use to produce unit output. The 
efficiency of a firm (represented by a point above the efficient 
isoquant) is measured by comparing it with a hypothetical firm which 
uses the factors in the same proportions. Farrel tested his technique 
using U.S. agricultural data over 48 states with one output (cash 
receipts from farming) and four Inputs (land, labor, material and 
capital) each of these variables being represented as the input of a 
particular factor per unit of output (1957, p.269). His results show 
that 20% of the states are 100% efficient, 9% are between 90-100% 
efficient, 30% are between 80-90% efficient, 25% are between 70-80%, 
13% are between 60-70%, and 3% are between 50-60% efficient.
The advantage of Farrel's technique is that no functionnal form 
has to be imposed on the data. The disadvantages are that constant 
returns to scale (CRS) is restrictive, the extension to non-CRS 
technologies is cumbersome, the frontier is particularly sensitive to 
extreme observations and measurement error, and the estimates which 
it produces have no stastitlcal properties.
2.2 Deterministic parametric frontier
I
Recognizing that the frontier production function forms the core 
of microeconomic theory, Algner and Chu (1968) outline ah empirical 
framework within which this frontier is observable. The authors
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define an industry function which resembles Farrel's efficient 
production function^. Though they go further by estimating with 
mathematical programming (linear and quadratic) a production function 
for the firm that expresses the maximum output obtainable from the 
input combination at the existing state of technical knowledge. 
Linear programming produces the envelope function by controlling the 
disturbance term to be of one sign only. The objective function 
appears as the summation of such disturbances and it is to be 
minimized subject to the constraint that each residual be non-positi-
ive.
Aigner and Chu start out with a Cobb-Douglas production function 
as specified by Hildebrand and Liu (1965). They derive the criterion 
function which they pose in a typical programming problem.2 Even 
though they do not refer to measures of efficiency, the technical 
efficiency of each observation can be computed directly from the 
vector of residuals since u**lnf(x)-ln(y) represents technical 
efficiency. Since their technique is based on the estimation of a 
production function, it is Impossible to obtain an estimation of 
allocative efficiency. Forsund and Hjalmarsson (1979) use a similar 
approach with a different production function taken from Zellner and 
Revankar (1969). Presenting estimates of structural efficiency from 
28 individual dairy plants during the period 1964-73 (Sweden),
*The industry production function is conceptually a frontier of 
potential attainment for given input combinations. The production 
function for any particular firm may conceptually be obtained from 
the industry function in terms of the firm's ability to implement 
optimal values of parameters in the industry. (Aigner and Chu, p.826)
^Aigner and Chu had only, as an objective, to derive a frontier 
production function. They did not try to measure technical effi­
ciency.
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Forsund and Hjalmarsson (p.303) show that the same output in 
different years could have been produced by 57-70% of the observed 
amounts of inputs u s e d . 3
From basically the same framework, Timmer (1971) Introduced a 
variant in deriving a probabilistic frontier model. Since this 
mathematical programming method is thought to be sensitive to 
outliers, he proposed to drop the most efficient observations from 
the sample until estimated coefficients stabilised. Timmer used a 
Cobb-Douglas production function and aimed at estimating technical 
efficiency for U.S. agriculture from 1960 to 1967 across states. His 
results indicate that 75% of the states had measured efficiencies 
within 10% of the frontier. The least efficient state was less than 
20% away from the frontier (pp.789-790).
The advantages of such a technique are the ability to characteri­
ze frontier technology in a simple mathematical form and to accomoda­
te non-CRS technologies. The disadvantages result in being restricted 
to homogenous production functions and in the fact that the method 
imposes a limitation on the number of observations that can be 
technically efficient (only as many technically efficient observa­
tions as there are parameters to be estimated). Also, the estimated 
frontier is supported by a subset of the data and is therefore 
extremely sensitive to outliers. Timmer has suggested discarding a 
few observations until the estimation of the parameters has stablll-
3The estimate of structural efficiency is represented by the distance 
of the average plant to the frontier function for given output. It is 
a measure of the relative reduction in the amount of Inputs needed to 
produce the observed average industry output with frontier function 
technology with the observed average factor proportions and size of 
plant (Forsund and Hjalmarsson, 1979, p.303).
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zed. The estimates which this method produce have no statistical 
properties $o no inferential results can be obtained. Finally, we 
cannot obtain a measure of allocative efficiency since the model is 
based on the estimation of a production function.
2.3 Deterministic statistical frontier model
Afriat (1972) was the first to introduce statistical analysis by 
making some assumptions about the distribution of the error structu­
re. He estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function (In y ■ In f(x) 
-u) where the residual term (u>0) was assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed (X was assumed to be exogenous). Afriat 
proposed a two-parameter beta distribution for u and estimated the 
model using the maximum likelihood method (MLE). With this technique, 
it is only possible to obtain a mean efficiency for the sample of 
firms, whereas the linear programming technique permitted a measure 
of efficiency for each firm. The estimated mean of u becomes the mean 
technical efficiency. When a specific distribution is assumed for u, 
the parameters of this distribution can be derived analytically from 
its higher moments and estimated consistently from the moments of the 
residuals. Using Aigner and Chu's statewide data on the U.S. primary 
metals industry, Greene (1980) estimated a translog cost function and 
its cost shares using annual time series data (1947-1971) for the U.S 
manufacturing sector. He used MLE and a Gamma density function. His 
results indicateo a mean technical inefficiency of about 2.2Z 
and no systematic allocative Inefficiency (pp.110-111).
The disadvantages of this technique include the fact that 
different assumed distributions for u lead to different estimates and 
we have no «a priori* strong arguments for any particular distrl-
V
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bution. Furthermore, the range of the dependent variable depends on 
the parameters to be estimated, violating the regularity conditions 
for MLE^. The frontier Is assumed to be deterministic, so the random 
shocks affecting the firms are Influencing the measurement of effi­
ciency. The advantages are that the estimates have statistical 
properties and are not strongly influenced by outliers. Furthermore, 
there are no limitations on the number of observations that can be 
efficient. We can use several' functional forms to characterize the 
technologies. Also mean measures of technical and allocative effi­
ciency can be obtained.
2.4 Stochastic statistical frontier model 
The above frontiers are deterministic. The essential idea behind 
the stochastic frontier model is that the error term Is composed of 
two parts: a symmetric component that permits random variation of the 
frontier across firms, and captures the effect of measurement error, 
other statistical noise, and random shocks outside the control of the 
firm; and a one-sided component which captures the effect of ineffi­
ciency relative to the stochastic frontier. This is represented by 
y - f(x) - (u+w) where w is the symmetric component and u the 
one-sided component, u > 0. Even though the frontier is stochastic,, 
the concept of technical efficiency is consistent with Farrell's
^Greene (1980) has shown that the density of u must satisfy certain 
conditions for MLE to be consistent and asymptotically efficient. But 
further problems remain with his method since estimation of the model 
where the distribution of the error term is assumed to be gamma 
distributed are very difficult to implement (according to Greene). 
When the distribution of the disturbance term is assumed to be 
exponential or half-normal, Schmidt shows that the regulatory 
conditions are violated; specifically the condition concerning the 
range of the random variable being dependent on the parameters 
estimated (1976, p. 239).
definition of technical inefficiency as an equiproportionate overuse 
of all inputs. Allocative efficiency results in utilization of inputs 
in the wrong proportions with respect to a particular output. The 
residuals of the input demand functions derived from the first order 
conditions of cost minimization are interpreted as a measure of 
allocative inefficiency. Therefore, the various measures of efficien­
cy presented earlier are still relevant in the context of a stocha­
stic frontier production function even though the efficient isoquant 
(frontier) is stochastic in the sense that its placement is allowed 
to vary randomly across firms while a one-sided component captures 
randomness under the control of the firm (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979, 
pp. 344-345).
Schmidt and Lovell (1979) have estimated such a model for priva­
tely-owned steam-electric generating plants operating In the U.S.. 
They obtained a measure of mean technical Inefficiency of 9.9% while 
allocative inefficiency was estimated at 8.1% (pp. 359-360). Steven­
son (1980) estimated a translog cost function using privately-owned 
regulated electrical utilities. His results indicated a mean techni­
cal inefficiency of 14.86%. No allocative inefficiency was reported 
since he estimated a translog cost function without its cost shares 
(p.65).
Another stochastic frontier model is the corrected ordinary least 
squares approach (COLS). This model starts with tha stochastic 
function specification presented earlier: y ■ f(x)- (iHv) where w is 
assumed to have a symmetric distribution to capture the random 
effects of measurement error and random shocks. Technical efficiency 
relative to the stochastic frontier is captured by the one-sided
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error component -u, u >0. The estimation procedure requires obtai­
ning residuals from an OLS estimate of the production or cost 
function. These residuals provide consistent estimates of the 
moments of the error distribution. This method requires an hypothesis 
about the distribution of the error terms as in the MLE estimation. 
Then, ve can correct the estimated constant term. Tills estimation 
method^ provides consistent estimates of all the parameters of 
the model.
The main advantages of the COLS estimate are that it is easy to 
use and provides consistent estimates of all the parameters of the 
stochastic model. The disadvantages include the fact that it is less 
efficient than MLE estimators and there is no guarantee that the 
estimates of the variances of u and w obtained from the moments will 
be non-negative. This would imply that some of the observations would 
be above the estimated frontier. A more serious weakness has to do 
with the fact that when using a model in which allocative efficiency 
is not assumed to be zero, the moments of the disturbance are 
intractable® and we cannot obtain consistent estimates of all the 
parameters. This limitation implies that the COLS method cannot be 
used when we want estimates of allocative as well as technical 
efficiency. Finally, this approach requires simple specifications 
like a Cobb-Douglas function in order to determine technical ineffi­
ciency from the distribution of the disturbance terms.
The main disadvantage of the stochastic frontier model with 
maximum likelihood . estimation is that there is no good «a priori*
^Schmidt and Lovell (1979) refer to it as the OLS/moment method.
®Schraidt and Lovell (1979, p. 357).
argument to select among possible specific distributions of the error 
terms. However, Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt have estimated a Cobb— 
Douglas production function for the 1957-58 data on the U.S. primary 
metals Industry across 28 states using exponential as well as 
half-normal distribution of the disturbance terms. Their results 
Indicate very close results for the estimated parameters of the 
production function and the distribution of the disturbances (1977, 
pp. 32-33). Furthermore, the choice of a functional form for the 
production function Is somewhat limited since the production function
i
must be homothetic.
The advantages of the latter approach include the fact that the 
presence of the symmetric component in the residual term solves the 
bounded-range problem encountered with some variants of the determi­
nistic frontier model; therefore, the regularity conditions for MLE 
are respected. Technical and allocative efficiency can be obtained 
by estimating a system of equations. The estimates of allocative 
efficiency can be obtained on an observation by observation basis and 
averaged in order to measure the mean allocative efficiency over the 
sample. Moreover, Jondrow et al. (1982) have shown that we can 
decompose the residual components of the production function in its 
two portions. They derive the conditional density function which 
allows an estimation of technical inefficiency on an observation by 
observation basis. Furthermore, the introduction of a stochas­
tic component in the model is certainly a step closer to reality. In 
a world of uncertainty, managers cannot be expected to control every 
aspect of the firm's environment (internal and asternal). Also, 
having to consider random shocks, statistical noise and measurement
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errors as part of inefficiency was a weakness of the deterministic 
models that has been overcome with the stochastic frontier models. 
Compared to deterministic parametric frontier models* stochastic 
frontier models are not as sensitive to extreme outliers* and no 
limitation is Imposed on the number of observations that can be 
efficient. Compared to the COLS models, more functional forms for the 
production function can be used to represent the underlying technolo­
gy7-
2.5 Non-frontier efficiency models 
Lau and Yotopoulos (1971, 1973) developed a model to measure 
technical and allocative efficiencies. A sample of n firms is parti­
tioned into two types (small vs large, public vs private, etc.). The 
prediction function is written:
Y j  -  A j  f ( x j [ )* 1*1,...,n
where the terms A j  > 0  index technical efficiency with the two types 
of firms being equally technically efficient if* and only if* A} * 
A2. The first order conditions for profit maximization are written 
d Ajf(x^)/d x* ■ lij(w£j/pj). The terms ljj > 0 index allocative 
efficiency and represent the ability of a type of firm to equate the 
value of an input's marginal product with its normalized prices. The 
two types of firms are equally price efficient if* and only if Ijj- 
l2j, and if they are absolutely price efficient* then ljj*l. Finally* 
the two types of firms are equally economically efficient if* and 
only if* their respective profit functions coincide* From a specified 
functionnal form* and the derived first order conditions for profit
?Kopp and Smith estimated a stochastic frontier model using a CES* CD 
and translog production function (1980).
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maxlmization( we can test the following hypotheses: equal technical 
efficiency! equal price efficiency! equal economic efficiency! and 
absolute price efficiency for each group of firm (for example! 
publicly owned vs privately owned firms).
The disadvantage of this model is that it cannot be extended to 
investigate efficiency on a firm-by-firm basis. Also* the functlonnal 
form chosen for the production function must be sufficiently tracta­
ble to permit derivation of the associated profit function. Further­
more, no absolute measure of technical efficiency can be computed 
since no efficiency frontier is estimated. Yotopoulos and Lau (1973) 
estimated their model using data from the small and large Indian 
farms between 1955 and 1957. Their results indicate that small farms 
are more economically efficient. The relative economic efficiency of 
small farms is not due to superior price efficiency (both are found 
to be price efficient)* but they have established the superior 
technical efficiency of the small farms (p. 22k')
A second model, developed by Toda (1976), can ba used to Investi­
gate allocative efficiency. He assumes that the firm is technically 
efficient, and its cost function is a generalized Leontlef function 
as follows:
c “ A11 Pi + 2 a12 Pl1̂ 2 P2^ 2 + a22 P2 
where
C - unit cost minimum at the given output level 
PI - price of capital as the shadow pries 
P2 - wage rate as the shadow price 
Ai2: o
Since the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to
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the factor prices must equal the quantity of that factor, 
k/y “ A n  + Aj2 (Pl/pz)-1^2 
l/y ■ A22 + A12 Cpi/pz)1̂ 2
where
k/y - capital-output ratio 
l/y - labor-output ratio 
Toda Introduces an hypothesis that the observed price ratio differs 
from the shadow price ratio by a fixed-proportIon a,
Pl/P2 “ a wi/w2 
where
wi - observed price of capital 
W2 - observed wage rate 
a > 0
Under this hypothesis the demand functions, k/y and l/y( are expres­
sed with the observed prices as independent variables 
k/y ■ A n  + Aj2 (a wi/w2)“*^ 
l/y ■ A22 + A12 Ca wi/w2)^^
Substituting the observed demand functions in the cost function 
C * A n  wi + (a“l/2 + ^ 2  w 2 * ^  + A22 *2
which is different from the minimum cost function 
C*« A n  W! + 2 A n  wj^/2 ^ 1 / 2  + ^22 W2 
When the coefficient a ■ 1, C* - C. At this point the observed price 
ratio coincides with the shadow price ratio. Toda suggests estimating 
a system of equations. After concerting the system of equations 
(demand functions) into an equivalent system shown as:
y “ A n  (a 1/2 _ a"l/2) + ̂ 12 a“*/2 w + ̂ n  ci + A22 *2
where
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y - (k/y, l/y)'
v - ((W1/W2 )1/2)'
d ” (0, (wj, W2)l/^)'; the dummy price variable, 
cj" (1, 0)'; the intercept,
C2“ (0, 1)'; the intercept,
If the observed prices equal the shadow prices (a - 1), the coeffi­
cient of the d variable will vanish so that the symmetry restriction 
across equations will be imposed on the coefficients of the price 
variables. Toda estimates the last system of equations with and 
without the d variable. The significance of the price disparity 
is tested by the extent to which the sum of squares of residuals 
diminishes by adding the d variable (pp. 259-262).
This model has been estimated by Toda (1976) for the Soviet 
manufacturing industries. His results indicate that for five indus­
tries one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the factor price 
ratio equals the marginal productivity ratio. Significant results are 
obtained only for three industries (p. 263).
The advantage of this method is that it can be used with more 
flexible forms. The disadvantages are that the measures of allocative 
inefficiency are not firm specific, and the parameter a measures 
only the systematic portion of allocative inefficiency (Forsund et 
al., 1980, p. 19)®.
2.6 Total factor productivity (TFP)
Caves and Christensen (1980) have used the total factor produc­
tivity approach to compare relative efficiencies. They claim that TFP
®According to Forsund et al. (1980, p. 19), technical inefficiency 
might be introduced in this model by adding one-sided disturbances to 
the input demand function and the cost function.
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is the single best measure of productive efficiency (1980, pp.960). 
TFP is defined as the real output per unit of real resources used. 
The computation of TFP requires the estimation of the following 
equation:
ln(TFPk/TFP1) -Z <Rik + Rn)/2 * In (Y^/Yn)- 
E ni <csik + CS±1)/2 * In (Xlk/Xik)
where
. k, 1 are adjacent time periods in the case of 
cross-sectional comparisons 
. Y's are output indexes 
. R's " " revenu shares
. CS's " input cost shares 
. X's " " indexes
. 1 denote the Individual output, input 
According to Caves and Christensen, this equation is the exact index 
procedure which corresponds to a homogeneous translog production 
function (p. 963). The estimation of such model for the Canadian 
railroad industry indicated that between 1956 and 1965 tha federally 
owned Canadian National railroad productivity Increased between 80% 
and 90% as rapidly as that of the privately owned Canadian Pacific 
railroad®. From 1964 to 1968 the relative productivity Increases were 
reversed (p. 967).
The advantage of this model is that it allows tha use of a more 
involved functionnal form (translog). The main disadvantage is the 
fact that TFP does not discriminate between types of inefficiencies. 
It does not provide an estimate of efficiency with respect to a
®The CN is owned by the Federal government while the CP is privately owned.
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frontier. In the measurement of TFP are incorporated returns to
scale, price effect, regulation effect, inefficiencies, ect., with no
way to separate them. Finally, it does not account for the random
variations outside the control of the firm, measurement error, or
other statistical noise that may affect the estimates. Finally, the 
measurement of increases in comparative efficiency will be affected 
by the starting point; if a firm is poorly managed and recoups some 
of its inefficiency over the years, it would perform well compared to 
an initially more efficient firm.
2.7 Dummy variable model 
Comparative efficiencies across various types of organizations 
have also been studied using average production^, cost and profit 
functions estimated by OLS techniques. In order to account for 
organizationnal differences a dummy variable is Included in the model 
to be estimated. Dllorenzo and Robinson (1982), Meyer (1975) and 
Pescatrice and Trapani (1980) used such a methodology. For example, 
Pescatrice and Trapani estimate a translog cost function assuming 
that the firm minimizes its cost of production. The model to be 
estimated is a system of equations composed of the cost function and 
its cost shares. After pooling the data for public and private firms, 
a binary variable reflecting the mode of ownership is introduced in 
the model. Efficiency is not estimated directly, but the comparison 
between organizations provides some measure of relative efficiency.
^Forsund et al. (1980, p20) state that the term frontier is asso­
ciated with maximal possible output while the average function is 
associated with mean output. The notion of an average function would 
perhaps be more meaningful in a random coefficients model. An average 
function can then be defined as the function obtained when the random 
coefficients obtain their expected values .
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(Estimates of relative efficiency obtained from the binary variable 
model will be presented in the next section).
The main advantage of this approach is its simplicity since it 
only requires estimation of a simple function using OLS. The dis­
advantages are numerous. First, the estimation of a production 
technology using a cost function and duality theory requires the firm 
to be efficient in the first place. This implies that the firm must 
be producing on its frontier and be allocatively efficient. Further­
more, the binary variable measures a combination of random shocks, 
technical and allocative efficiencies. Finally, it uses the concept 
of mean output which does not allow an estimate of an efficient 
frontier, and therefore, no absolute measure of efficiency can be 
computed.
3- Review of the literature on estimates of relative efficiencies of 
private and public electric utilities**.
Many empirical studies have been done with the electric utili­
ties, covering a vide range of topics including measurement of 
economies of scale, elasticities of substitution and technical 
c h a n g e * ^ .  Few of them address the issue of efficiency comparisons 
across various types of organizationnal structure. The following 
section reviews these contributions with respect to their metho­
dology, results, and validity.
Meyer (1975) is concerned about the influence of ownership on the 
adoption of new innovations and other costs of providing services. To
**As far as we can tell, there is no study dealing with consumer 
cooperative electrical utilities and the concept of efficiency 
comparison.
*2see Cowing and Smith (1978) for a survey of that literature.
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test his hypotheses he makes use of the duality relationship between 
technology sets and cost functions. He used a dummy variable approach 
which pooled both private and public firms; and used a Chow test for 
the equality of all the coefficients estimated for the private and 
public firms. The model estimated is as follows:
Cost - f (dummy, gen, gen2, gen^) 
where
Cost - total cost of production,
dummy - dummy variable to account for ownership form, 
gen - net generation in 1000's kwh as a measure of output. 
Meyer found significant differences in the cost function between 
private and public utilities in each year (1967, 1968, 1969), with 
public firms having lower costs (no magnitude of the difference was 
given). The Chow test indicated that the coefficients of the cost 
functions were not the same (p. 393).
Even though Meyer concluded that ownership seemed to matter, he 
recognized that sources of the cost difference were not identified. 
No attempt was made to control for such important factors as prices 
of inputs, technology, regulatory influences and the objective 
functions of each ownership structure.*3
Sowell (1978) assessed the relative efficiency of private and 
public enterprises. He hypothezised that neither private nor public 
firms are likely to satisfy the prerequisites for efficient alloca­
tion; based on non transferability of ownership, an active zero
^However, Meyer recognizes that comparison of cost alone cannot 
determine whether firms are using the least cost technology availa­
ble. He noted that technological possibilities, prices of inputs as 
well as objective function have to be accounted for (p. 392).
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profit constraint* and low opportunity costs associated with non pe­
cuniary income, he predicted that the effects on resource mlsalloca- 
tion should be more pronounced for publicly owned firm. Recognizing 
that production may be characterized by: (1) increasing returns to 
scale, (2) limited ex-post substitution, (3) non-neutral technical 
change, Sowell retained a generalized Leontief production function. 
Regulatory constraint and price subsidization were specified in his 
models estimated for private and public plants respectively. Input 
demand functions were derived and estimated. His model tested for 
fixed input coefficients, duality between cost and production which 
implies consistency with cost minimization, substitutability between 
inputs, cost differences between ownership forms, and a test for the 
possibility of difference between market and reported prices using 
Toda's methodology. If duality between cost and production holds 
exactly for each form of ownership, Sowell states that cost differen­
ces arising from different technologies may be ruled out; when both 
forms show cost minimizing behavior, cost differences can be Imputed 
to input prices and relative efficiency of ownership structures (p 
.41). But if both are cost minimizing, cost differences can be 
imputed to different technologies and/or different prices. Furthermo­
re, if duality holds, the plants will exhibit cost minimizing 
behavior, allocative inefficiency accounted by differences between 
market prices and reported prices is ruled out. His models were 
estimated on annual observations of steam electric generating plants 
placed in operations in the Southern United States between 1950 and 
1970. The data on costs for the plants covered five years from 1968 
to 1972. The sample included 30 private and 14 publicly owned plants.
Sowells' results Indicated that the regulatory constraint for the 
private firm was not binding. Furthermoret the underlying duality 
between cost and production functions were satisfied, Implying that 
cost minimizing input combinations were estimated. However, his 
results indicated allocative inefficiency in private firms with 
respect to capital and fuel. Those results are in contradiction with 
the implication of cost- minimization which requires the firm to be 
both technically and allocatively efficient (Forsund et al., 1980, p. 
7). Using the sample means for the price variables and the level of 
output, the average cost and the marginal cost were .02$/kwh and 
.0175$/kwh, respectively. The constrained estimates were not fully 
consistent with cost minimization for publicly owned firms. The 
subsidization of input prices did not significantly influence the 
firm. Again using the sample means for input prices and the level of 
output, the estimated average cost and marginal cost were .055$/kwh 
and .069$/kwh, respectively. Based on the comparisons of average and 
marginal costs, Sowell concluded that the private firms were more 
efficient than the publicly owned firms. His input demand equa­
tions suggested that both ownership forms shoved allocative ineffi­
ciency.
Sowells' results are contradictory since he claims that duality 
between cost and production exists even though allocative inefficien­
cy is reported. Furthermore, even if duality was confirmed, cost 
difference could still be attributed to technology differences as 
well as price differences. Sowell assumed that technology of public 
and private firms were similar since they respect the duality 
condition, and he drew his conclusion on the basis of AC and MC
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comparison after controlling for price differences.
Pescatrice and Trapani (1980) sought to determine whether there 
is a significant cost difference arising from alternative forms of 
ownership. Their methodology required the derivation of objective 
functions for both public and private firms. The regulated private 
firm is perceived as minimizing its internal cost of producing a 
given level of output, while the objective of the public firm is 
revenue or output maximization under zero profit constraint. Using a 
translog production function and cost minimization, they estimate a 
cost function and the cost share equations for a sample of 33 private 
and 23 public firms. A dummy variable accounts for the type of 
ownership. Output, factor prices and technology^ are controlled. A 
pooled sample is estimated assuming the regulatory effect on private 
firms is zero. Their results suggest that public firms have 24-332 
lower per unit costs than private firms. They attribute these 
differences to the behavioral objectives of public and private firms, 
whereby public firms seek to minimize true cost while private do not 
because of the effective rate of regulation of private firms^ (p. 
275).
Dilorenzo and Robinson (1982) hypothesize that public firms 
operating in a competitive environment act in ways similar to their 
private counterparts. Political competition is thought to impose the 
same cost-minimizing pressures on public managers as does economic 
competition on managers of private firms. They predict no difference
^Pescatrice and Trapani consider only electric utilities using 
fossil-fuel (coal, gas, oil) steam-electric operations to generate 
electricity. Furthermore, vintages are also accounted for.
l^The Averch-Johnson effect could not be confirmed (p. 271).
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in production efficiency between ownership structure. Their estima­
tion is based on the following short run cost function:
TC ■ ao + aj Gen^ + a2 Fuelj+ 33 Capi+ ej 
where
TC = total annual steam production expenses,
Gen. ** steam generation in kwh,
Fuel = weighted average fuel cost per billions of kwh,
Cap 9 total generating capacity of steam plant,
Dilorenzo and Robinson controlled for technology by using firms fqr 
which steam electricity generation accounted for a great majority of 
total net generation. They retained those firms with average net 
generation for the sample period between .5 and 4 billions kwh. 
Finally, only those utilities which provided service to every 
customer type were included*®. To test for efficiency differences, 
they pooled the sample of public and private firms, and a dummy 
variable was included in the above cost function. The results 
indicated that privately owned electric utilities were significantly 
less cost efficient than public electric utilities (p. 120). They did 
not report the magnitude of the difference. Dilorenzo and Robinson 
did not explain their results other than by saying that rate regula­
tion leads to overutilization of capital while public firms could 
be enhanced toward more efficiency when they are operating in a 
competitive envlronnement (p. 112).
4- Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed several models that could be used to
*®Their data set included 18 public firms and 23 private firms for 122 
observations over the years 1970-1972.
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test for efficiency. The selection of the proper model has to 
consider what each of those is capable of doing with regard to the 
objective that is pursued. The stochastic frontier model offers 
several advantages over other models.
If ve compare stochastic frontier models to deterministic parame­
tric and non-parametrlc models, the former have the advantages of 
allowing an unlimited number of observations to be technically 
e f f i c i e n t ^ ? ,  and it is not sensitive to outliers. Random shocks, 
statistical noise, and measurement errors are not confused with 
measurement of technical efficiency. The stochastic models permit 
measurement of technical and allocative efficiencies separately and 
these estimates have testable, statistical properties. Finally, 
deterministic parametric frontiers represent the concept of best 
practice technology while stochastic frontier models represent the 
most efficient technology. The best practice technology is likely to 
overestimate technical inefficiency. They can estimate technical 
efficiency observation by observation.
When comparing the stochastic frontier models to the determin­
istic statistical models, the stochastic frontier models shows some 
advantages while deterministic statistical model shows a bounded 
range problem when using such distributions as exponential and 
half-normal disturbance terms. (Greene has shown that it was possible 
to solve that problem by using a Gamma density function, but the 
model becomes very difficult to estimate). The deterministic statls-
l?The stochastic frontier model and the deterministic statistical 
model allow each firm to be efficient with respect to its own 
frontier while the deterministic parametric model is based on the 
concept of best practice technology one can observe.
tlcal model considers random shocks, measurement error and statisti­
cal noise as part of technical efficiency while the stochastic 
frontier model separates those from technical efficiency. Both models 
have no «a priori* good arguments to select a distribution for the 
disturbance term. Furthermore, both models can estimate technical 
efficiency observation by observation when technical and allocative 
efficiency are estimated simultaneously. Finally, they are both 
limited in the choice of functional form: the production function 
must be homothetic.
The advantages of stochastic frontier model over non-frontier 
models are due to the fact that inefficiency parameters estimated 
from non-frontier models are not firm specific, even for allocative 
efficiency measurement, and measure only the systematic portion of 
allocative inefficiency (Forsund et al., 1980, p. 19). It is argued 
by Forsund et al. that technical inefficiency can be introduced by 
adding one-sided disturbances to the system of input demand equa­
tions, but this procedure makes the model stochastic.
Finally, when compared to the dummy variable model, tha 
stochastic frontier model shows several advantages as well. First, 
the concept of an average function, which is used in the dummy 
variable model, does not represent the most efficient technology. Tha 
dummy variable measures a combination of random shocks, technical, 
and allocative efficiency (when the cost function is estimated) and 
is not capable of discriminating between them. No absolute measure of 
efficiency (technical and allocative) can be obtained from such a 
model. Furthermore, the estimation of a dummy variable model requires 
that we pool date for different ownership structures together in
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order to estimate the coefficient of the binary dummy variable. This 
procedure can cause biases when technologies are different! which may 
be the case for public and private utilities.
Several papers dealing with the comparison of efficiencies by 
ownership types have been reviewed. All the papers reviewed show 
methodological limitations. Three of those used the dummy variable 
approach and estimated that public utilities were more efficient than 
private utilities. Pescatrice and Trapani estimated the cost diffe­
rence between private and public to be 24-33% per unit of output in 
favor of public utilities. All three papers estimated cost functions, 
used pooled public and private utilities, and assumed that technolo­
gies were the same (no dummy variables were introduced to account for 
possible different coefficients in the cost functions). From those 
studies we have an indication that public utilities are more effi­
cient. We do not know if one or both ownership structures are 
efficient, and we have no indication as to which type of ineffi­
ciency is more Important.
Sowell's procedure is more appropriate since he used an approach 
developed by Toda in estimating a generalized Leontlef average cost 
function and its input demand equations. He estimated different 
models for each ownership structures and controlled for regulation as 
well as capital subsidization for public firms. He used aversge 
output and input prices to calculate AC and MC for each ownership 
structure. Private utilities showed lower AC and MC than public 
utilities. Furthermore! his estimates allowed him to conclude that 
both private and public utilities were allocatlvely inefficient. 
Sowell did not provide any separate estimates of technical and
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allocative efficiency. However, his results are contradictory since 
he claims that private and public plants respect duality conditions, 
and at the same time they show allocative inefficiency. His conclu­
sion on ownership efficiency is based on a comparison of AC and MC. 
but technology of public and private plants are not controlled for.
The review of these tests of efficiency and ownership structure 
shows that much remains to be done. The next chapter presents an 
appropriate methodology and the models to be estimated in order to 
answer some of the questions regarding the technical and allocative 
efficiencies of various ownership structures.
FOURTH CHAPTER 
TECHNOLOGY AND MODELS TO BE ESTIMATED
1- Introduction
To characterize technology, the main features of interest are: 
substitution among factors, returns to scale and homotheticity, and 
the nature of technical change. Several functional forms are availa­
ble to capture the characteristics of the technology; the most 
frequently used are : (1) Cobb-Douglas, (2) CES, and (3) Translog. 
Other functional forms can be found in the literature: (1) Zellner- 
Revankar, (2) Nerlove-Ringstad, (3) Fixed coefficient, and (A) 
Generalized Leontief. Only the first three models will be discussed 
with respect to their ability to capture the features of technology
of electricity generation. Those three are better known and most
\
widely used.
Section two discusses the basic characteristics of the technology 
underlying electricity generation. Section three discusses the 
various restrictions that functional forms (C-D, CES, translog) place 
on the underlying technology. The fourth section discusses the choice 
of the proper functional form with respect to the objectives of the 
research, the possible distortions due to their built-in restric­
tions, and the ability to capture technololgy. Finally, in the fifth 
section, the theoretical model to test for efficiency differences Is 
presented. This section includes the functional form of the produc­
tion function, the justification of the objective function for eech 
type of firms, a derivation of the system of equations that will be 
estimated, and the relevant likelihood function.
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2- Technology of electricity generation
2.1 Basic characteristics
Technology of electricity generation can be characterized at 
three different levels: boiler-turblne-generator (BTG), plant, 
and firm. It can be characterized differently for estimation at 
each of those levels of aggregation. Kopp and Smith (1978, p. 
1050) argue that returns to scale measured at the firm level will 
depend not only on the returns to scale of the plants but also on 
their respective rates of utilization. The characteristics of 
technology will be influenced by the aggregation process. Fischer, 
et al. (1969) also argue that differences in the type of plants 
and their pattern of use across firms can seriously affect the 
relationship between characteristics attributed to the technology 
from aggregate firm estimates.
A second basic characteristic to consider when estimating 
technology is to distinguish base load from peak load plants. 
Electric utilities have to supply all demands for electricity. Since 
demand fluctuates over time, some plants are used only to satisfy 
peak demand. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to mix plants 
aimed at different uses, even if they embody the same technologies. 
According to Kopp and Smith (1980), either some adjustment for 
capacity utilization or selective sampling of plants will be necessa­
ry to assure comparability in the association between the flows of 
inputs and output produced for all plants in the sample. Since it is 
difficult to develop accurate measures of input usage and to correct 
for peak versus base load use, selective sampling technique is more
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appropriate. It Is argued that plants of recent vintages are likely 
to be base load plants^.
The third basic characteristic refers to whether one seeks to 
estimate ex-ante or ex-post technology. Ex-ante refers to technology 
at the blueprint stage. The entrepreneur selects a configuration of 
generating equipment from these blueprints, perhaps on the basis of 
input prices. Ex-post refers to the technology associated with a 
specific blueprint that has been put In place in the plant. Features 
of the technology, and certainly efficiencies may appear different if 
we are using ex-ante or ex-post data to estimate the production 
function. Once a plant's design characteristics are fixed in terms of 
a specific configuration of capital equipment, technology is ex-post 
and the scope for substitution will be substantially reduced. In this 
research, models with assumed ex ante and ex post technologies are 
estimated separately.2
2.2 Factor substitution 
The use of ex-ante rather than ex-post technology models as 
well as the use of plant rather than firm will affect the estimates 
of factor substitution elasticity among inputs. Ex-post technology 
should show less substitutability among Inputs than estimates
lit makes sense to assume that new plants will be of base load 
characteristics since technical change is mostly embodied in electri­
city generation. Firms will have Incentives to use new plants (and 
most efficient) if they behave as cost minlmizers. Older plants (lass 
efficient ones) would be kept for peak load purposes. Of course, the 
least cost operation requires the use of appropriate plants. This 
plant mix problem is not considered in this research.
^A8 will be described in chapter 5, our data set comprises information 
with respect to the first 5 years of operation of each plant. 
Therefore, it is likely that we will not have a clear ex ante or ex 
post technology, but a mixture of both.
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using ex-ante technologies. For example, Cowing and Smith's survey 
article (1978,p.180) shows that elasticities of substitution estima­
ted using ex-post technology models are less than those for ex-ante 
models, though still significantly different from zero in both 
cases.^ The estimation of various pair elasticities ranges from .1 to 
.75.
2.3 Technological change 
Technical change characterizes the process by which a technology 
changes over time. Generally it involves a description of the 
mechanism by which these changes are introduced into the production 
activities and an indication of their effect on optimal factor input 
use.
Embodied technical change has been shown to be appropriate for 
the technology of electricity generation (Cowing and Smith, 1978, p. 
179). It specifies that new capital equipment reflects the changes 
which occur in technology. In this case, different technologies are 
distinguished according to the time periods, or vintages, In which 
the capital equipment was built. Technological changes have also been 
shown to be labor and fuel saving, that is to say non-neutral (Cowing 
and Smith, 1979, p. 179).
2.A Scale effects 
The scale effects refer to whether technology is homogenous 
or homothetic. Most empirical studies have assumed electricity 
generation technology to be homothetic (MRTS is constant along a 
factor ray) (Cowing and Smith, 1978, p. 178). However, Christensen
^All the studies reviewed by Cowing and Smith except two (Nerlove, 




and Greene (1976, p. 665), estimate input share equations derived 
from a translog cost function, arguing that technology is non-ho­
mo the tic.
Technology also has to be characterized with respect to returns 
to scale. According to Cowing and Smith (1978, p. 178) there appears 
to be significant scale economies in steani generation between small 
and intermediate-size BTG units.
3- Functional forms^
3.1 Cobb-Douglas
The Cobb-Douglas production function is represented as follows :
(3.1) Y » A Ka Lb Fc 
The Cobb-Douglas representation Imposes the following restrictions 
on the production technology :
(a) homogeneity of degree r-a+b+c; and homothetlcity
(b) elasticity of substitution - 1; implying that 
factor shares are independent of their prices.
(c) weak separability between Inputs (the MRTS 
between any input pair is independent from the
t
level of any other input)
Weak separability has the unrealistic implication that changes In 
relative prices of variable Inputs will induce changes in the demand 
for those Inputs which are Independent of the level of fixed Inputs.
In addition, technological changes can be expressed in terms of 
variations in the parameters of the production function over time. 
Variation in the Intercept parameter A represents neutral techno­
logical change. A change in the Intercept parameter represents a
^This section draws from Brown (1966) , and from Intriligator (1978).
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disembodied technological change and can be depicted as a shift of 
the entire production function. It does not affect the MRTS between 
inputs. A non-neutral technological change is depicted by a variation 
in the ratio of the two elasticities of production; for example, a 
change in b relative to a or c. This alters the MRTS between inputs. 
Factor saving or factor using technical changes are indicated by the 
direction of change of these ratios.
3.2 Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
The CES production function was developed in response to the 
restrictive characteristics of the. Cobb-Douglas production function. 
It does not impose unitary elasticity of substitution among inputs, 
although it requires that elasticity be constant and independent of 
the level of factors of production used. It is represented as 
follows:
(3.2) Y - A a K-t + b L“fc + c F-t -r/c 
where A is a neutral parameter, t is a substitution parameter, 
a, b, c are share parameters, and r represents the degree of homoge­
neity of the function (i.e. the degree of returns to scale^). Its 
characteristics are:
(a) homogeneity - r; the CES i6 homogeneous of degree r 
in the input levels.
(b) elasticity of substitution, 8 “ l/(l+t)
(c) strong separability
In the multi-input case s is identical for all input pairs.
^The CES production function was derived independently by two groups, 
Arrow et al. (1961) and Brown et al. (1963). The second derivation is 
more general since it permits any degree of returns to scale as 
opposed to the first presentation where constant returns to scale is
assumed.
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Thus, although the CES function allows for elasticities of substitu­
tion different from one or zero, It does present the Inconvenience of 
imposing equal substitution possibilities among all input pairs.
Disembodied technological change can be captured through para­
meter A and is classified as neutral technical change. Another 
parameter change which does not affect the MRTS between Inputs is r, 
the parameter that captures the degree of returns to scale. Non­
neutral technical change will be associated with share parameters a, 
b, c as well as with s, the elasticity of substitution.
3.3 Transcendental logarithmic (Translog)
The functional forms above imposed severe restrictions on the 
nature of production technology. In particular, restrictions regar­
ding the elasticities of substitution and weak separability may be 
unrealistic and may induce serious specification errors in empirical 
analyses.
The development of more flexible forms provide appropriate func­
tions to measure characteristics of technology. Flexible forms 
provide second order approximations to arbitrary functional forms. A 
functional form is flexible if the parameters of such a function may 
be chosen such that the value of the function and its first and 
second derivatives coincide with the value and first and second 
derivatives of any arbitrary function. Since the elasticities of 
substitution and separability conditions depend upon these values, a 
flexible form can accurately represent the elasticities of substitu­
tion and will be free of any separability restrictions. The translog 
is the most popular of these flexible forms. It reduces to multi-in­
put Cobb-Douglas and a CES as special cases. It can be written as :
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(3.3) In Y ■ In 8q + aalnA +E ajlnxj+ 1/2 baa(lnA)2+
1/2E ni^nj b^jlnx£lnxj+ Enj_ b^lnx^lnA 
where Y - output 
x±- inputs
A - technology index 
This function is in general non-homothetic but it Includes 
homogeneity of degree one as a special case. When we assume homothe- 
ticity, the restrictions imposed on the translog correspond to
homogeneity of degree one. Furthermore, the assumption of Hicks- 
neutral technical change is usually made. Therefore, with homo- 
theticity and Hicks neutrality, the translog production function is:
(3.4) In Y - InA + lnao+E jailnx-i+ 1/2E iEjbijlnx^lnxj 
The factor shares are represented as follows :
(3.5) Si ■ ai+ buln xj+ bj^ln X2 + bjjln X3
The factor shares are dependent on the input levels. Therefore,' 
this function is non-homothetic and non-separable unless restric­
tions are Imposed on the parameters.
The Allen partial elasticities of substitution for the three
input case are:
where G is the determinant of the input share equations and Gjj is 
the cofactor Gjj in G. The estimated AES can be computed for each 
observation and input pair.
Finally, the translog is well suited to test if technical change 
is disembodied and/or embodied.
4- Selection of proper functional form
The selection of a functional form requires that we consider
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the following elements: (1) objectives of the research (not all 
estimated functional forms provide the same information), (2)
critical distortions in the estimated results caused by built-in 
restrictions in functional forms, and (3) the capacity of capturing 
critical characteristics of the technology.
In this research we are not directly Interested in estimating 
the various characteristics of technology of electricity genera­
tion. The critical point is that the functional form does not 
distort estimates of inefficiency. Since the information required 
to test for efficiency differences across ownership structures 
will be provided by the disturbance terms appended to each model, 
all the above functional forms will provide the necessary infor­
mation.
Each model presented in section 3 has advantages and disad­
vantages. The translog production function offers the most flexibili­
ty in capturing the characteristics of technology. However, the use 
of stochastic frontier model requires homothetic production functions 
in order to discriminate between the types of inefficiencies (Greene. 
1980, p. 103). For the translog, this means Imposing homogeneity of 
degree one. However, the estimation of a translog production function 
model along with its factor shares, is a considerably more difficult 
task than estimating other functional forms. It takes up a lot of 
degrees of freedom and requires imposing restrictions across equa­
tions. CES functional form allows varying rates of factor substitu­
tion, though substitution will be equal for each pair of inputs. It 
also allows varying returns to scale. However the CES production 
function is difficult to estimate since it cannot be linearized with
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respect to Its parameters. It has been shown to be difficult to fit 
to most data sets (Brown. 1966. p. 61). For the Cobb-Douglas form, 
factor substitution elasticities are constrained to be equal to one, 
while returns to scale are unconstrained. Technical change can be 
incorporated as embodied or disembodied change. Of all the functional 
forms Cobb-Douglas is the simplest to estimate.
The distortion of efficiency measurements caused by various 
production function models has been analyzed by Kopp and Smith 
(1980, p. 1057). They compare functional forms (C-D, CES, translog) 
with various frontier estimators. Their results^ are shown in 
table 1:
Table 1
Estimates of technical efficiency 
and characteristics of technology 
using various functional forms
type of functional forms
vintage? C-D CES Translog
Technical 1 .828 .828 .846
inefficiency 2 .950 .952 .954
Returns to 1 1.003 1.002 IB
scale 2 1.054 1.005 1.244
Elasticities of 1 1.0 .95 IB
substitution 2 1.0 .867 .705
IB means ill-behaved
The measurements of technical inefficiency estimated from each
^Only the results with respect to stochastic frontier estimators 
are presented.
^Vintage refers to different technologies that are distinguished 
according to different time periods in which the capital equipment 
was built. Kopp and Smith pooled all steam electrical plants built 
between 1961 and 1965 in the first vintage, while plants built 
between 1966 and 1969 were grouped in the second vintage.
functional form are very similar**. These results are important 
since they seem to indicate that the selection of a functional 
form will not affect the measure of technical inefficiency. The 
Cobb-Douglas would impose a given shape upon the isoquant, since 
factor substitution is equal to one. From what we know about the 
technology, elasticity of substitution is less than one. To assume 
that s * 1 would flatten the frontier isoquant and impose an unrea­
listic assumption on the model. Therefore, it would likely result 
in a larger error term representing allocative inefficiency. If 
we assume .that all organizational forms have similar elasticities 
of substitution among input pairs, the bias introduced by the 
unrealistic assumption of substitution elasticities equal to one 
would not likely differ across ownership types**.
From the previous section we know that empirical studies show 
electricity generation technology to exhibit mildly increasing 
returns to scale, substitution among factors less than one for 
ex-ante technology; and, finally, embodied technological change, 
which is best captured by vintages and capital-using models.
Even though Cobb-Douglas is a more restricted form than the
**Kopp and Smith did not obtain estimates of allocative inefficien­
cy since they used only a production function.
^However, Sowell (1978, p. 89) states that: the general pattern of 
Allen elasticities of substitution are not similar for public and 
private plants. Private plants exhibit strong capital-labor and 
fuel-labor substitution and virtually zero fuel-capital substitu­
tion. Public plants display strong labor-fuel substitution and 
limited fuel-capital substitution. Labor and capital are comple­
ments in publicly owned production .
others^, it is an appropriate model considering the objectives 
of the research and the limited distortions it places on technical 
inefficiency measurements. The Cobb-Douglas production function 
will be selected because: (1) it provides us with all the required 
information to compare technical and allocative efficiencies among 
various organizational forms, (2) it does not Introduce biases in the 
measurement of technical inefficiency, (3) it captures several 
Important characteristics of technology underlying electricity 
generation, (4) it is easier to estimate than any other functional 
form, (5) it has been used with stochastic frontier estimation, 
providing us with a benchmark to compare our results; and (6) it is 
not evident that placing unrealistic restrictions on substitution 
elasticities will affect the relative measures of allocative ineffi­
ciency across ownership types.
5- Model to be estimated
5.1 Introduction
The complete model requires that we select a proper objective 
function to characterize the behavior of the firms. This is an 
important task since measurement of inefficiency depends on a 
standard of comparison which is derived from our behavioral hypothe­
ses with regard to each type of ownership structure. We also have to 
derive the system of equations from the selected production function 
and the objective function. We have established that a stochastic 
frontier model best meets the objectives of this research. However,
lOtfe have to remember that frontier estimator requires homothetlcl- 
ty, and because of that restriction translog is assumed to be 
CRTS. Furthermore, a translog functional form is more difficult 
to estimate because of restrictions across equations.
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the use of such a model requires some hypotheses about the error 
structure. Such hypotheses will be discussed and a derivation of the 
relevant likelihood function will be presented. A discussion of the 
estimation procedure will complete this section.
5.2 Objective function for each type of ownership
In electric utilities, the literature strongly suggests that 
output is exogenous to the firm. Nerlove was one of the first to 
assume that electric utilities would, therefore, behave as cost 
minimizers. He argued that**:
1. Power cannot be stored in large quantities and must be. 
supplied on demand.
2. Revenues from the sale of power by private companies depend 
primarily on rates set by utility commissions and other
regulatory bodies.
3. Much of the fuel used in power production is purchased under 
long-term contracts at set prices. The level of prices is
determined in competition with other uses.
4. The industry is heavily unionized, and wage rates are also set 
by contracts that extend over a long period of time. Over long 
periods, wages appear to be determined competitively.
5. The capital market in which utilities seek funds for expansion 
is highly competitive and the rates at which individual utili­
ties can borrow are little affected by individual actions over 
a wide range.
From these characteristics Nerlove draws two conclusions. First,
it is possible to regard output of a firm and the prices it pays for
^Nerlove- (1963, p. 168)
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inputs as exogenous. Second, the problem of the individual firm in 
the industry would appear to be that of minimizing the total costs of 
production of a given output, subject to a production function and 
the prices it must pay for factors of production. Most economists 
have followed Nerlove'8 cost minimization assumption on the grounds 
that output is exogenous to the plant. The arguments presented to 
justify cost minimization for private utilities can apply to public 
as well as cooperative utilities. Power cannot be stored for them any 
more than for private plants. Prices of fuel and labor will certainly 
be determined with long term contracts as for the private plants, 
and will be determined competitively over long periods. The price 
of capital for public and cooperative firms is not a market price. 
Both are receiving subsidies from the government. However, the price 
of capital is still exogenous to the firm since it is determined by 
governmental policy. Only the rate of return condition is not met. 
This is Irrelevant in this context since output is exogenous to the 
plants. Even if public and cooperative firms aimed at maximizing 
profit, the optimum solution would be equivalent to that of cost 
minimization when output is e x o g e n o u s * 2 .
5.3 Derivation of models to be estimated 
Several models can be derived and estimated to obtain the 
Information required to test our hypothesis with respect to efficien­
cies of ownership structure. One could directly estimate a production 
or a cost function. The former is inappropriate since the estimates
12Pescatrice and Trapani hypothesize that public utilities will 
have an objective of revenue or output maximization rather than 
profit maximization. Furthermore they present some evidence that 
public utilities behave as cost mlnimizers (1980, p.271).
79
would be inconsistent. This is because output is exogenous and inputs 
are related to one another through cost minimization. Such a model 
would show severe multicolinearity and has to be rejected. The 
estimation of the cost function can be appropriate under certain 
circumstances. Since the right-handside variables of the cost 
function are exogenous, it can be estimated without worrying about 
complications due to simultaneity. However, the cost function model 
does not provide all the Information needed to distinguish technical 
and allocative inefficiencies. The moments of the disturbance 
characterizing the stochastic cost function (to be described later) 
are intractable, and we cannot manipulate them to obtain consistent 
estimates of the parameters of the distribution of the disturbance. 
It means that we cannot distinguish between technical and allocative 
inefficiencies on the basis of a cost function alone^3. However, if 
we make the hypothesis that plants are allocatively efficient, a 
cost function is sufficient to measure technical efficiency. In 
order to obtain consistent estimates of all the parameters, we 
can estimate a system composed of a production function and the 
first order cost minimizing conditions; or alternatively, estimate 
the set of derived input demand equations. According to Schmidt 
and Lovell (1979, p. 357) the simpler choice is to apply a Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator (MLE) to the production function and the first 
order conditions. Assuming a C-D technology, the Lagranglan and first 
order conditions are:
13Schmidt and Lovell (1979, p.357)
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(5.1) Z - PkK + P]L + PfF + g Y - A Ka Lb Fc
Pk - A a Ka_1 Lb Fc - 0
Pi - A b Ka Lb_1 Fc - 0
Pf - A c Ka Lb Fc_1 - 0
Y - A Ka Lb Fc ■ 0
Using price of labor as Che numeraire, these conditions can be 
rewritten as:
(5.2) lnPk - lnPi - ln(a/b * L/K)
InPf - InPi - ln(c/b * L/F)
In Y » InA + a In K + b In L + c In F 
In the absence of technical or allocative inefficiencies, equations
(5.2) will compose the original system to be estimated.
A firm's production process can be Inefficient in two ways, 
only one of which can be detected by an estimated production function 
alone. Technical inefficiency occurs when the firm fails to maximize 
output given its input bundle. This results in a proportional 
overutilization of all inputs. Allocative inefficiency occurs when 
the firm does not equate MC^>MCj for i different from j; i.e. when 
first order conditions do not hold exactly. This results in utiliza­
tion of inputs in the wrong proportions, given input prices. If we 
assume that the firm is allocatlvely efficient, we can derive a cost 
function as follows:
1. From the first order conditions:
(5.3) K* - Px/Pjt * a/b * L  
F* - Pj/Pf * c/b * L
2. From the C-D production function:
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(5.4) Y « A Ka Lb Fc ev_u, 
we obtain L*,
(5.5) L* - Y1/* A“l̂ r (Px/Pk*a/b)-a/r (Pi/Pf*c/b)"c/r
3. Substituting L* In the Input demand equations and simplifying:
(5.6) K* - A”*/* Y1/* (Pi/Pk*a/b)(r-a)/r (Pl/Pf*c/b)-c/r e-(v-u)/r 
F* - A*1/' Y1/* (Pl/Pk*a/b)“a/r (Pi/Pf*c/b) («)/* e-(.v-u)/t
4. Substituting F* and K* In the cost equation, and normalizing 
with respect to Pi (In logarithmic form):
(5.7) In (C/Pi) - G + 1/rlnY - a/r ln(Pi/Pk) - c/r ln(Pi/Pf) -
l/r(v-u)
where
G ■ In r - 1/r In A - 1/r In (aa + bb + cc) 
r ■ a + b + c
P - price of capital, labor, fuel 
C - total cost of production
5. When estimating a short run cost function, Kg Is fixed, and 
the cost function can be derived following the same procedure as 
for the long run cost function; presented In logarithmic form the 
short run coat function is as follows (normalised with respect 
to Pi):
(5.8) In (C-PkK0)/Pi - G - a/r lnK0 + 1/r InY - c/r ln(Pi/Pf)
- 1/r (v-u)
where
G - A (c/b)® + (c/b)b -!/r 
In order to Incorporate technical and allocative Inefficien­
cies in the estimating equations, we can amend eq. (5.2) as follows:
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(5.9) In Y =■ InA + alnK + blnL + clnF + (v-u) 
lnPfc - lnP3 ln(a/b * L/K) + e2
InPf - InPi - ln(c/b * L/F) + e3
The stochastic production function specifies output of each firm 
as being bounded above by a frontier that is stochastic In the sense 
that its placement is allowed to vary randomly across firms. The firm 
is allowed to be technically inefficient relative to its own fron­
tier. Interfirm variation of the frontier captures the effects of 
exogenous shocks beyond the control of the firm. The disturbance
term (v-u) in eq. (5.3) is made up of two parts: a symmetric compo-.
*
nent v capturing this randomness outside the control of the firm, and 
a one-sided component u capturing randomness under the control of the 
firm. The latter is technical inefficiency. Allocative inefficiency 
appears in eq. (5.9) as the disturbances from the exact satisfaction 
of the first order condition for cost minimization* (e2>< 0, e3><0).
In order to discriminate among the various components of the 
residuals, we need to make assumptions about v, u, and ej. Several 
distributions of the disturbances can be hypothesized. As mentioned 
in the third chapter, the choice of a distribution for the disturban­
ces is done without much theoretical guidance. Schmidt and Lovell 
(1979, p.349) state that cthere is no particular good reason to
assume a given distribution for the disturbance term. The only real
solution is to try various alternative distributions and see which 
fits best.*^
l^Aigner, Schmidt and Lovell (27) estimated a production 
function assuming disturbance (u) to be distributed with a 
half-normal and an exponential. The results indicated that the 
parameters of the production function were very close. As for the 
estimates of technical inefficiency, they were also very close.
This research assumes that the distribution of the one-sided 
error term, u, is a positive half-normal; it is the absolute value 
of a variable distributed as N (0, s^u)* The symmetric component v 
is assumed to be distributed as N (0,s^v), It is assumed that there 
is no systematic tendency to over or under utilize any input relative 
to any other input given true internal prices; therefore, e^ « (e2> 
e3> has a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and 
covariance matrix! It is also assumed that e^ is independent of v 
and u^a
The following information is obtained from estimate of eq. (5.9) 
(Schmidt and Lovell, 1979, p. 356); estimates of:
(a) parameters of the production function,
(b) s^v, which specifies the stochastic character of the product­
ion function,
(c) s^u, from which we can obtain an estimate of the mean of u, 
which represents the average deviation from the frontier due 
to technical efficiency,
(d) I , which specifies the distribution of the disturbances in 
the set of first order conditions, from which allocative 
efficiency can be measured.
The MLE of eq.(5.9) requires a proper likelihood function. This
15The Averch-Johnson effect, if it exists, be explicit in the input 
demand functions. Therefore, the e^ represents deviations from the 
optimal input use after the A-J effect is controlled.
l^Those assumptions are taken from Schmidt and Lovell (1979).
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likelihood function can be derived from the assumptions made about 
the disturbance terms of the original system (v, u, ej). By assump­
tion. the density of e± is the density of N(0,£):
(5.10) g(e^) ■ £2j-l/2exp -1/2 e'Z“ ê
The density of (v-u) represents the sum of a symmetric normal 
random variable and a truncated normal random variable:
(5.11) f(v-u) - 2/s f*((v-u)/s)[l - F*((v-u)ds-1)J
where s ■ /~(s2u+ s2v); d “ su/sv; and f*(*) and F*(*) are the 
standard normal density and the cumulative distribution functions, 
respectively. Since (v-u) is assumed to be Independent of e^, the 
joint density of e-t and (v-u) is the product of g(e^) and f(v-u). 
The likelihood function is, therefore:
(5.12) l-(21r)-1[£]-1/2exp -l/2^e'S^e] 2/s f*((v-u)/s)
[l-F((v-u)d/sf| 
the relevant log-likelihood function becomes:
(5.13) L - -ln(2ir)-l/21n[£] -1/2E(et'Zet)+ ln(2/s)
+ Inf((v-u)/s) + In l-F((v-u)d/8)
where
£ : represents the variance-covariance matrix of e^
s22 : (In K- In L - In Pj/Pk “ lna/b)2
s23 : l/TST(ln K - In F - In Pf/Pfc - lna/c)
This log-likelihood function can be maximized numerically with 
respect to the parameters (A, a, b, c, s, r and £) to obtain the 
maximum likelihood estimates. He can find the optimizing values 
with an algorithm such as Davldon-Fletcher-Povell (DFP).
FIFTH CHAPTER 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
1- Introduction
The second chapter outlines relations between property rights 
structures of various ownership forms and the concept of efficiency; 
while the third and fourth chapters have reviewed the empirical 
models used to measure efficiency, and presented the technology and 
models to be estimated, respectively. This chapter will present data 
and results from estimation of the models developed in previous 
chapters. The second section restates the testing procedure. The 
third section explains the data used. The fourth section presents the 
estimations and interprets the results with respect to efficiencies 
of various organizational forms.
2- Presentation of the models
2.1 Dummy variable model
Several models will be estimated to measure efficiencies of 
ownership structures. First, since most of the empirical litera­
ture testing relative efficiency of ownership structures is based 
on estimation of a dummy variable model, the following cost function 
model is estimated:
(5.1) LnCC/Pi) - G + 1/r In Y - a/r In (Pi/Pfc) - c/r ln(Px/Pf)
+ di V + d2 Pub + d3 Coop + ej
where
Ln(C/Pi) - total cost of production normalized with 
respect to price of labor, in logarithmic form,
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G - intercept term,
Y - output,
**k,l,f " price of capital, labor, fuel,
V - dummy variable accounting for vintages of technolo­
gy, 0 for the first vintage embodied in plants built 
between 1965-1968 and 1 for plants built between 
1969-1973,
Pub - dummy variable accounting for ownership 
structure, 0 for private and cooperative utilities, and 
1 for public utilities,
Coop - dummy variable accounting for ownership structu­
re, 0 for private and public utilities, and 1 for 
cooperative utilities, 
r - returns to scale (a + b + c)
G, r, a, b, c, dj, d£, d3 - parameters to be estimated, 
e^ - disturbance terms with N(0, s^e).
This cost function is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function 
under assumption of cost minimization. This model will be estimated 
using OLS, and will provide us with baseline measures of efficiency 
between ownership structures. The Information about relative effi­
ciency is captured by the coefficients of the dummy variables d2 and 
d3-
2.2 Stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function
a) Long run cost function 
A second set of models is estimated using a stochastic frontier 
Cobb-Douglas cost function. Since our data set (to be described in 
the next section) most likely captures a combination of ex ante and
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ex post technology we estimate both long run and short run cost 
functions. Assuming allocative efficiency, the long run cdst function 
derivable from the Cobb-Douglas production function is as follows:
(5.2) Ln(C/Pi) - G + 1/r In Y - a/r In (Pi/Pfc) - c/r In (Pi/Pf)
+ dj V - 1/r (v-u)
where
G, r, Y, Pk,l,f* v > a* c, are as previously defined, 
v - symmetric component of the disturbance term 
capturing randomness outside the control of the firm, 
distributed as N(0, s^v),
u - one sided (non positive) component capturing 
randomness under the control of the firm, distributed 
half-normal with N(0, s2u).
The stochastic frontier cost function presented In eq. (5.2) contains 
factor prices as arguments. Its estimation provides evidence on the 
magnitude and cost of total Inefficiency. However, with this cost 
function model it is not possible to decompose the estimates of total 
cost inefficiency into its technical and allocative portion. The long 
run cost function is estimated for each organizational form.
The estimation procedure followed to estimate eq.(5.2) uses MLE 
assuming that the distribution of the one sided error term, u, 
is half normal while the symmetric component, v, is assumed to be 
normally distributed. The density function of (v-u) is (Aigner, 
Schmidt and Lovell, 1977, p. 26):
(5.3) f(v-u) - 2/s f* (v-u)/s 1 - F*((v-u)ds“l)
where s - (s2u+s2v)1/2. - su/sv; f* and F* are the standard
normal density and the cumulative distribution function respectively.
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The log-likelihood function using the density function (5.3) can 
be maximized numerically with respect to the parameters (G, a, c, 
r, s, d) In eq. (5.2) and eq. (5.3) to obtain the maximum likeli­
hood estimates. The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) algorithm is 
used to obtain the optimizing values.
Using the same stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function, 
we estimate a model for private regulated electric utilities that 
incorporates a regulatory constraint. Following Pescatrice and 
Trapani (1980, p. 261), we assume that the internal cost of capital 
is defined as follows:
(5.4) P1̂  - Pfc - z (p - Pk)/(1 “ z) 
where
P*k - internal price of capital for private utilities,
Pk ~ market price of capital (to be defined in the next 
section),
z - regulatory constraint multiplier,
p - average rate of return by firm in current and previous 
two years.
The regulatory constraint, z, is a measure of the tightness of 
regulation. In the case where the allowable rate-of-return regulation 
is set above the profit maximizing level, then regulation is ineffec­
tive and z - 0. At the other extreme, if the allowable rate-of-return 
is set equal to Pk, then z ■ 1. If z is binding on the private firm 
(0 < z < I), the firm minimizes the internal total cost, C* - PjL + 
PfF + P^kK* Th® estimation procedure follows the estimation of the 
long run cost function except that Pk is replaced by P*k *n eq.(5.2). 
To 'search for the appropriate specification of internal price of
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capital, we use the method employed by Pescatrice and Trapani, 
whereby z Is assigned the values 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 (Pescatrice and 
Trapani, 1980, p. 268)1. The Information obtained from such a 
model permits measurement of Inefficiency while the regulatory 
distortion Is controlled for.
b) Short run cost function 
Since our data are likely to capture a combination of ex ante and 
ex post technology we need to estimate a short run stochastic 
frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function. The model Is as follows:
(5.5) Ln (C-PfcKo)/?! - G - a/(b+c) In K0 + l/(b+c) In Y
- c/(b+c) ln (P^/Pf) - (v-u)/(b+c) 
where all parameters are as previously defined, and Kq is ths 
fixed quantity of capital used at the plant.
The estimation of such a model will be done using MLE technique 
and the likelihood function presented in eq.(5.3) following the 
procedure described with regard to eq. (5.2). This formulation of the 
cost function has the advantage of eliminating the price of capital 
from the estimation, and Pfc is difficult to measure, as we will see 
in the next section. Furthermore, the regulatory distortion problem 
over the internal P^ is solved. The estimation of this short run cost 
function provides estimates of the parameters of the cost function 
and an estimate of mean Inefficiency for each organizational form.
*The value of z Is unknown. Therefore, we assign different values 
to z, and an overall significance of the models estimated with 
various values of z (0.0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8) is computed comparing 
R^, log-likelihood value and F statistics. The appropriate value 
of z is selected given the highest values on those three statistical 
tests.
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2.3 System of equations
a) Long run Cobb-Douglas production function 
In order to obtain separate estimates of technical and allocative 
efficiencies for each ownership structure, we estimate a system of 
equations as presented in eq.(5.6):
(5.6) ln(Y) - A + aln(K) + bln(L) + cln(F) + (v-u)
In(L) - ln(K) => ln(b/a * Pfe/Pl) + e2 
ln(L) - ln(F) » ln(b/c * Pf/Px) + e3 
where
Y - output 
K - capital 
L - labor 
F - fuel
**k,l,f “ prices of capital, labor and fuel respect­
ively,
v - symmetric component capturing randomness outside 
the control of managers,
u - one sided component capturing error under the 
control of managers,
e^ - disturbances from the exact satisfaction of the 
first order conditions with N(0, 8^e),
A, a, b, c - parameters to be estimated.
Technical inefficiency appears in the long run production function 
and is measured by u. In order to calculate mean technical ineffi­
ciency from the ancillary parameters we use the following formulas^
^Stevenson, 1980, p. 60.
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(1): su = s Cl/^l/(d2+l))], (2) E(u) - (/2//ir) * su; where d - 
su/sv, s «* ̂ " ( s 2 u + s 2 v ) , 3  Estimates of d and s (the ancillary parame­
ters) are obtained from the maximized likelihood function. Estimates 
of E(u) can be interpreted as measures of mean inefficiency, while 
E(u)/r represents the cost of mean technical inefficiency where r 
measures the return to scale^. Allocative inefficiency is Introduced 
in the first-order conditions. In this model, the disturbances ln the 
first-order equations will be interpreted as measures of over/under 
capitalization with ,respect to fuel and labor. The cost of technical 
inefficiency is. measured as (l/r*u), while the cost of allocative, 
inefficiency is measured as E-ln(r)^. Total cost of inefficiency is 
the summation of the technical and allocative components.
Ve can estimate the system of equations (5.6) using MLE deriving 
a proper likelihood function. Following Schmidt and Lovell (79, 
p.349), the density function for (v-u) is the same as the one .shown
3(1) s = (s2u + s2v)l/2
(2) d — su/sv
Following Aigner, schmidt and Lovell (1977, p. 26), this particu­
lar parameterization of s and d (obtained from the derivation of 
the density function of v-u) is convenient because d can be interpre­
ted to be an indicator of the relative variability of the two sources 
of random error that distinguish firms from one another. From those 
definitions we can derive the formulas for su and E(u) as follows:
(3) sv = su/d
( 4 ) s =» (s2u + s2u/d2)l/2
(5) s - su (1 + 1/d2)1/2
(6) su = s [i/Va+i/d2n
while E(u) ■ (*2/inr)*su Is derived from the moments of u.
^The formula for the cost of mean technical efficiency is derived 
from the Cobb-Douglas cost function (see eq. 5.7 ln chapter 4).
^E-lnr is the estimated cost of allocative inefficiency where 
E = c/r * e3 + b/r * e2 + In a + c * exp(-03) + b * exp(-02) » 
where a, b, c are parameters of the production function, e2 and 
e3 are the mean residuals from the exact minimization of the first 
order conditions in eq. (5.6). Lnr is the natural logarithm of the 
estimate of the return to scale (r=*a+b+c).
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in eq.(5.3). We assume that ei=(e2» has a multivariate normal
distribution:
(5.7) f(et) - (2TT)-1 [E -l]exp [-1/2 e'E^e ].
where j « £s22 S33/S23 S32] is the variance-covariance matrix of 
e^. By assumption, (v-u) and ej are assumed to be Independent. 
The joint density function is the product of f(v-u) and f(e£):
(5.8) f £(v-u) ,e)=*(2 u [eJ)“1 exp £-l/2e 'E -*e ](2/s) f* £ (v-u)/s)]
[ 1 - F* ((v-u)d/s)].
The likelihood function associated with eq.(5.6) and eq. (5.8) 
can be maximized numerically with respect to the parameters (A, 
a, b, c, d, s , z )• These estimates will be consistent and asymp­
totically efficient.
b) Short run production function 
The system of equations is also estimated using a short run 
production function when Kq is fixed:
(5.9) Ln(Y) = G + a l n K Q + b l n L + c l n F +  (v-u)
Ln(F) - Ln (L) = ln p?i/Pf * c/b]+ e2
where all parameters are as previously defined.
From the estimation of the system of equations (5.9), using MLE
and the log-likelihood function derived from eq. (5.8), we obtain
estimates of the parameters of the production function as well as the 
ancillary parameters from which we can calculate mean technical and 
allocative inefficiencies for each type of ownership structure. As 
before, such model has the advantage of eliminating the measurement 
problem of the price of capital.
2.4 Models to be estimated
In summary, the following models will be tested.
I. cost function with dummy variable 
?. stochastic frontier cost function
2.1 long run cost function
2.1.1 private utilities
a) no adjustment for regulation








3. system of equations
3.1 long run production function
3.1.1 private utilities
a) no adjustment for regulation
b) adjustment for regulation
d: 0.0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8
3.1.2 public utilities
3.1.3 cooperative utilities






To measure comparative efficiency of various ownership struc­
tures, we have selected the steam-electric generation Industry in the 
U.S.. This Industry shows interesting characteristics: (1) three 
different ownership structures are generating electricity using the 
same technology (steam-electric generation with fossil fuels); (2) 
standardized data for all three types of firms are available (produc­
tion as well as financial data); (3) technology of steam-electric 
utilities has been studied for over 25 years.
The data are measured at the plant l eve l * * .  All plants built 
after 1965 were considered. Plants prior to 1965 could not be used 
because the Federal Power Commission did not publish production 
data relative to cooperative utilities. Plants with joint ownership 
were dropped. Those plants selected are most likely to be of base 
load characteristics rather than peak load?. The data for all 
three types of ownership are a pooling, of cross-section and time 
series of plants. They cover new plants built between 1965 and 1973®
**We have to recognize the influence of the aggregation process 
(the firm being a gathering of plants) on the estimation of the 
characteristics of technology as well as measures of technical 
and allocative inefficiencies. For instance all measures of cost 
inefficiency are directly related to measures of economies of 
scale. Furthermore Aigner et all (77) have estimated technical 
inefficiency on aggregated data and found very little evidence 
of it.
?It makes sense to assume that new plants will be of base load 
characteristics since technical change is mostly embodied in electri­
city generation. Firms will have an incentive to use new plants (most 
efficient ones) to satisfy base load demand if they behave as cost 
minimizers.
®In this industry effects of technological changes are embodied in 
capital. Thus, following conventional practice we have subdivided 
this sample in two vintages according to the data of each plant's 
initial year of operation.
for which the necessary data are available. The data are from the 
first full year of operation through the fifth year. There were 37 
plants built by privately owned electric utilities during that 
period, providing 150 observations. Consumer cooperative utilities 
constructed 16 plants, for 71 observations. Publicly owned utilities 
were the least active group, building 9 plants from which 33 observa­
tions were obtained.
Strong differences exist among the studies surveyed with respect 
to measurement of the price and cost of capital. Dhrymes and Kurz 
(1964) and McFadden (1964) estimated cost of capital as the estimated 
value of the plant less non capital cost divided by a measure of 
capital input. Nerlove (1963), Cowing (1974), Christensen and Greene 
(1976) and Lovell and Schmidt (1979) estimated cost of capital as the 
nominal interest rate on the firm's bonds prior to plant installa­
tion. Petersen (^75) and Sowell (1978) estimated cost of capital 
using the Jorgenson formulation of the annual rental price of 
capital. Wilson (1976) used a discounted cash flow model to evaluate 
the cost of common stock which he used as a proxy for cost of 
capital. Finally, Stevenson (1980) and Pescatrice and Trapani (1980) 
used a weighted average of the cost of debt, preferred and common 
stock to estimate the cost of capital. Stevenson used a discounted 
cash flow model to estimate the financial cost of common stock 
capital while Pescatrice and Trapani measured the cost of equity 
capital by dividing dividend payments by the equity capital.
The cost of capital is the minimum rate of return necessary 
to attract capital, and it can be defined as the expected rate of 
return prevailing in capital markets on alternative investments
of equivalent risks^. The cost of capital is a forward-looking 
concept since it is an expected rate of return. Furthermore, it 
is an opportunity cost concept which depends on the risk of the 
investment and is determined in capital markets. The cost of capital 
for a company is a weighted average of the costs of capital for the 
various investments of which the company is comprised. The capital 
structure characterizing a company is a mix of debt and equity 
(common and prefered stocks). According to Kolbe and Read (1984, 
p.44) the cost of common equity capital is what poses a problem in 
estimating the cost of capital. Return on preferred equity is equal 
to preferred dividends divided by the book value of preferred stock 
while the return on debt is equal to the interest expenses divided by 
the book value of debt. Therefore, they focus only on discussing 
problems related to estimates of cost of commmon stock. The cost of 
preferred equity and the cost of debt can be observed directly ln the 
market because the promised amount and timing of preferred dividends 
and interest are fixed. Several methods to estimate cost of common 
equity capital are reviewed and evaluated by Kolbe and Read (1984), 
but only two will be discussed in this chapter, comparable earnings 
and discounted cash flows models, since those are the methods found 
in the empirical literature.
The comparable earnings (CE) method uses rates of return on 
equity (ROE) of comparable risk investments. ROE is calculated by 
taking net income earnings less interest and taxes, and preferred 
dividends; and dividing by the summation of common stock, paid-in
^This paragraph draws from Kolbe et al. (1984), and from Vilson 
(1976).
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capital and retained earnings, less treasury stocks. Common stock 
Is the par-value of common shares Issued, retained earnings Is the 
cumulative net Income that has not been distributed as either 
preferred or common dividends, and pald-ln-capital is the excess 
over par value that was received when the shares were issued. 
Treasury stocks represent the book value of common shares that 
have been reacquired by the company since they were issued. Kolbe 
and Read (p. 45) argue that comparable earnings is a poor method 
to evaluate the true cost of capital from the point of view of 
the regulator: (1) it is hard to select firms of comparable risks,
(2) the cost of capital is Inferred from the book rate of return for 
these comparable risk companies, (3) the book rate of return is based 
on generally accepted accounting principles but it will only equate 
the true rate of return by accident (accountants exercise considera­
ble discretion in the application of generally accepted accounting 
principles), (4) book earnings do not distinguish between excess and 
normal returns since no adjustment for security prices is considered, 
(5) the accounting concepts of income and value are not the same as 
the corresponding economic concepts (asset values are historical 
costs and are different from market values or replacement costs), (6) 
depreciation to write down systematically the original cost of assets 
is different from the change in the value of an asset, and (7) 
accounting errors due to inflation vary across asset life. According 
to Kolbe and Read (p.49), the most serious problems are the histori­
cal cost principle and the accounting depreciation schedule.
The objective of our research is not to determine what should be 
the appropriate rate of return that should be allowed to the regula­
ted private firm. Instead we are interested ln determining the cost 
of capital facing a firm. The problems outlined above are related to 
estimates of the cost of common stock, which represents only one type 
of capital used by private firms. Long term debt is the most impor­
tant source of fund, contributing more then 50% of all capital used. 
Therefore, the comparable earnings method, which was the most widely 
used method of estimating cost of capital by regulators through the 
late 70's, can still be appropriate to estimate cost of capital for 
private regulated firms in our study.
The discounted cash flow model (DCF) estimates the cost of equity 
capital as: r - Dj/Pq + g, where r is the estimated cost of capital, 
Di is the dividends that stockholders received in period 1, g is the 
estimated long term growth rate of dividends and Po is the common 
stock price at the end of period 1. A potential problem with the DCF 
model is the steady growth assumption. It is difficult to apply when 
the company is in a transition between growth paths. On average, the 
DCF method gets good results in estimating cost of capital when times 
are stable, and is widely used by regulatory commissions (much less 
so in the early 70's) (Kolbe et al., p.60).
Even though the DCF method seems superior to the CE method, 
we used the CE method because (1) most regulatory commissions 
used such method to determine the allowed rate of return between 
1965-1975, (2) the distortion is affecting only a portion of the 
capital structure and (3) the data required were more easily availa­
ble.
The estimation of the cost of capital for publicly-owned and 
cooperatives utilities is a simpler problem since their capital
structures are fairly straightforward. In the case of publicly- 
owned utilities, the structure of capital is composed primarily 
of long term debt, retained earnings, and other government sources of 
capital. The cost of long term debt is readily known, and the cost of 
equity is approximated using the rate on treasury bills maturing in 
10 years. The structure of capital of cooperative utilities is even 
simpler since it is composed almost entirely of long term debt 
obtained through REA at a rate set by law of 2% until 1971. For many 
cooperatives, their loans and utility plant (at cost) are •almost 
identical. When cooperatives showed equity, its cost was approximated 
using the same rate of treasury bills maturing in 10 years as used 
for public utilities.
In this research the variables used in estimation were measured 
as follows. Output is the net generation of electricity measured in 
millions of KWH/year. Host other studies of electric utilities have 
used such a measure of output (see Kopp and Smith (1980), Schmidt and 
Lovell (1979), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980), Dhrymes and Kurz 
(1964), McFadden (1964), Nerlove (1963), Petersen (1975), Christensen 
and Greene (1976)). Capital was measured as cost of plants ln 
thousands of dollars*® (see Lovell and Schmidt (1979), Pescatrice and 
Trapani (1980), Komiya (1962), Courville (1974), Barzel (1964), 
McFadden (1964), Bellnfante (1969)). Other measures, such as instal­
led generating equipment (also referred to as nameplate capacity) 
(Barzel (1964)) and net continuous plant capability (Sowell (1978) 
were used. Fuel was measured in millions of BTU burned per year. All 
researchers referred to previously measured input fuel in terms of
*®The price of land and land rights is excluded.
BTU burned per year. Labor was measured in average numbers of
employees * 2000 hours per year. Again most researchers have used
this measure. The price of fuel was measured as cost per million BTU, 
measure which is provided by the FPC on a plant basis. The price 
of labor was measured as total cost of maintenance production 
divided by total hours worked per year. A few researchers used a 
regional average wage as a proxy for price of labor (Nerlove (1963), 
Lovell and Schmidt (1979), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980)). Those 
studies used an estimate of the manufacturing wage rate of the state
in which the firm operates. The price of capital for private regula­
ted firm was measured as the sum of interest on long term debt + 
dividend on preferred and common stock divided by long term debt + 
equity (common and preferred stocks issued). The price of capital for 
publicly owned utilities was measured as the sum of Interest on long 
term debt + cost of equity capital** divided by long term debt + 
(investment of municipality + retained earnings). The price of 
capital for cooperative utilities was measured as the sum of interest 
on long term debt + cost of equity capital divided by long term debt 
+ total net worth.
The descriptive characteristics of the sample used for the three 
types of ownership forms are presented in table 1:
**As a proxy for cost of equity capital cost of long term govern­




















Models will be estimated with respect to samples of plants of public 
utilities, cooperative utilities, small plants private utilities, 
large plants private utilities as well as full sample of private
plants.
4- Results and interpretations
4.1 Dummy variable cost function
The first model estimated is the Cobb-Douglas cost function 
with dummy variables on a pooling of data for all three types of
l^The full sample of private plants shows much higher mean values 
for data measurements. Therefore, to make samples more compara­
ble, the private sample has been divided into plants with output 
smaller than 3500 millions of KWH/year, and into plants with output 
larger than 3500 millions of KWH/year. The first sample contains 75 
observations and shows a mean output of 1823.5 millions of KWH, while 











































firms. Results are presented in Table 2.13
Table 2
OLS estimates of Cobb-Douglas cost function,eq.5.I, 
with dummy variables 
using a pooled of samples (253 observations) 
t-ratios ln parentheses
constant output Pl/Pk Pl/Pf V Pub Coop
K 1/r a/r c/r dj d.2 d3
10.687 0.844 -0.138 -0.722 0.125 -.013 -.129
(109.25) (63.08) (-6.84)(-43.6) (6.37) (-.42) (-4.92)
R-square : .978 
F-statistic : 1841.4
The first dummy variable accounts for vintages; all plants built 
between 1965-1968 take a 0 value while all plants built between 
1969-1973 take a value of 1. The results are statistically signifi­
cant and indicate that the second vintage group shows higher cost of 
production than the first vintage group. Moreover, the cost differen­
ce between the two vintage groups represents 13.3Z. The other two 
dummy variables account for ownership structures. Private firms are 
the control group, Pub has a value of 1 for public firms and 0 for 
privates and cooperatives, Coop has a value of 1 for cooperatives and 
0 for privates and publics. Both dummy variables have negative 6igns 
indicating that private firms are the least efficient type of 
ownership structure. Only the coefficient of Coop is significantly 
different from zero. Moreover, its magnitude Indicates a difference 
of 13.76Z between cost of production for private and cooperative
l^when this cost function is estimated using the sample of small 
private plants combined with the sample of public and cooperati­
ves, the cost difference between private and cooperative utili­
ties reduces to 10.3Z and is statistically significant.
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utilities*^.
4.2 Stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function
a) Long run cost function 
Results from the second model eq. 5.2, are obtained from maximum 
likelihood estimates of the stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost 
function assuming that firms are allocatively efficient. Estimates 
are presented in Tables 3 and 4.15 The cost function has been 
estimated for each sample of types of firms. Furthermore, ln the case 
of the private regulated firms, the model has also been estimated to 
account for the regulation effect by using the internal price of 
capital, as presented in equation (5.4)16. The regulatory constraint 
multiplier, z, was given the values of 0.0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 while p 
(the allowed rate of return) was measured as an average of actual
l^Cost difference between private and cooperative:
(Cco - Cpr)/Cpr " " eb " 1_ e. 129 _ i m 1.1376 - 1 - .1376.
Therefore, the cost difference between cooperative and private
utilities is 13.76%.
l^Those results were obtained by numerical techniques which implies 
maximizing the log-likelihood function by choice of the unknown 
parameters G, a, c, r, s, d. Starting values are provided by estima­
tes of the OLS/moments method. The program used is Llmdep (written by 
W. Greene). The maximization of the likelihood function was done with 
the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm (Greene, 1980, pp. 41.1-41.5) 
which is very popular and has proved very efficient in many applica­
tions (Judge, Griffiths', Hill and Lee, 1980, p. 734). The estimation 
of the asymptotic variance of MLE is calculated from the inverse of 
the Information matrix (Kmenta, 1971, p. 160). Limdep uses the Berndt 
et al. estimator to calculate the asymptotic variance matrix for the 
MLE when FRON is used to estimate stochastic frontier cost function 
(Greene, 1980, p. 16-1). When the User Defined Minimization routine 
is used to estimate the system of equations (see results presented ln 
tables 10, 11, 12), Limdep minimizes the likelihood function using 
DFP and the information matrix is approximated using a formula given 
ln Greene, 1980, p. 41-4.
*6()nly the full sample of private plants was used to estimate the 
long run cost function while accounting for the regulatory effect.
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rates earned by the firm during the current and previous two years 
(Pescatrice and Trapani (1980, p.275).
The results from the stochastic frontier long run cost function 
give us estimates of the parameters of the cost function (from which 
we could derive parameters of the production function) and the 
ancillary parameters, from which we can calculate the mean technical 
inefficiency and its cost!?. Mean inefficiency was lowest for 
cooperatives, 7.8%. Publicly-owned utilities show a mean inefficiency 
of 13.1%. However, results obtained for private utilities after 
dividing the sample into small and large plants show a mean ineffi­
ciency of 13.9% for smaller private utilities, showing a cost due to 
mean technical inefficiency of 11.27%. The cost due to mean ineffi­
ciency was lowest for cooperatives, 6.5%, with public utilities 
showing 11.6% of its cost being caused by its technical inefficiency. 
The larger plants show a mean inefficiency of 27.14% for a cost of 
mean technical Inefficiency of 27.2%. The introduction of the 
regulatory constraint ln the estimated cost function (using the full 
sample of private plants) affected the results for mean inefficiency 
only slightly. Mean inefficiency was lowest for private utilities 
when z 3 0.2, and E(u) - 20.11%, as table 4 s h o w s *8. Only when z was 
equal to 0.8 did the estimation of mean inefficiency Increased to
l?See footnote # 3 for a discussion of mean technical inefficiency and 
its cost.
l^The highest R^a value is obtained when z«. 2 which also shows the
value of InL and the highest F statistics.
R^- InL F statistics
z - 0.0 .910 44.5 378.7
z - 0.2 .914 45.6 385.5
z - 0.5 .908 43.6 358.9
z ■ 0.8 .881 13.7 171.9
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24.1%. The cost of mean technical Inefficiency is highest for private
utilities, around 16.7% when z ■ .2.
Table 3 
Stochastic frontier 
Long run Cobb-Douglas cost function 
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)


















































































































Long run cost function 
Estimates of ancillary parameters (technical and cost inefficiencies) 
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
type of ownership sigma(s) lambda(d) E(u) E(u)/r
private .2767 2.399 .2038 .1704
(34.3) (7.86) (26.66)
priv (reg = 0.2) .2737 2.361 .2011 .1677
(34.8) (8.15) (27.21)
priv (reg = 0.5) .2738 2.319 .2006 .1639
(34.97) (8.71) (28.30)
priv (reg = 0.8) .3257 2.482 .2410 .1883
(23.9) (5.66) (19.79)
priv (small) .1918 2.236 .1397 .1127
(4.53) (2.64) (3.79)
priv (large) .3723 2.248 .2714 .2725
(15.6) (4.99) (14.18)
public .1670 5.133 .131 .116
(6.37) (1.61) (6.35)
cooperative .1033 2.995 .0782 .065
(5.79) (2.00) (5.04)
The estimated inefficiencies for private utilities are
i those obtained by Schmidt and Lovell (1979). Using
privately owned steam electric generating plants constructed in the 
U.S. between 1947 and 1965, they showed a mean technical inefficiency 
of 15.75% which Increased cost of production by 12.6%. Kopp and Smith 
(1980) estimated a stochastic frontier production function for 43 
private and public steam electric generating plants built between 
1961 and 1972 using a pooling of cross section and time series data 
from 1969 and 1973. After dividing the period into two vintages they 
obtained an estimate of mean technical inefficiency of 18.87% for the 
oldest vintage while their measure dropped to 5.l3% for the youngest
vintage. Finally. Stevenson (1980) estimated a translog cost function 
using a sample of 81 observations of electrical private utilities 
in 1970. His result indicates a mean technical Inefficiency of 
14.86%.
To test whether mean Inefficiencies are significantly different 
from one another we test for the difference between two m e a n s  
Letting the true mean of the first population be ui and the mean of 
the second population be u£» the null hypothesis is Hq: uj=U2. The 
appropriate test statistic from which we can define the acceptance 
and the critical region with the help of normal probability tables 
iŝ O:
(5.10) Z = £ (mean Xj-mean X2) - (U1-U2) ̂ //"(s^/nj+s^/^)
where X} and X2 are means of the respective samples. 8^1 and 8^2
are variances of the respective samples, and ni* n2 sample sizes.
Table 5
Test for difference between two means
(1) priv(full)/coop : Z ■ 68.31
(2) priv(full)/public : Z - 8.23
(3) public/cooperative : Z ■ 13.56
(4) priv(small)/coop : Z » 13.30
(5) prlv(8mall)/public : Z ® 1.61
critical value of 1.96
For all tests, except prlv(small)/public, between two means presented 
in table 5. we have to reject the null hypothesis that both means are
l^Kmenta (1971, p.136)
20we can still use that test even though populations are not assumed to 
be normal since the sample size is greater than 30.
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equal at 95Z confidence, Z< 1.96.
The confidence Intervals for the mean inefficiencies of each 
sample are presented In table 6, and calculated using^: (5.11) 
Xj - Za/2 * S£, Xj + Za/2 * si where X^ Is mean technical Ineffi­




private .1888 < X^ <.2188
public .0799 < X± <.1817
cooperative .0478 < X^ <.1086
private (small) .0676 < X^ <.2176
critical value of 1.96
Results presented in Tables 3-6 suggest that consumer coope­
ratives are the most efficient type of ownership. Three different 
tests have been performed: 1) an asymptotic t-test, 2) a test 
for differences between means, and 3) the asymptotic confidence 
interval for each sample. From those tests, we can establish that 
results obtained from stochastic frontier long run cost functions 
confirm our conclusions derived from the simple dummy variable 
model. Furthermore, they provide us with the magnitude of mean 
inefficiency for each ownership structure. However, the effect of 
size of plants on technical inefficiency cannot be overlooked 
since mean Inefficiency nearly doubles when It Is taken into effect.
^Following Judge, Griffiths, Hill and Lee (1980, p.753), it is not 
necessary to assume normally distributed errors for setting up 
confidence interval as presented in Table 6.
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b) Short run cost function 
The model presented ln equation (5.5) has been estimated, and 
results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The estimation of this short 
run cost function provides estimates of the parameters of the cost 
function and an estimate of the mean technical inefficiency for 
private (small plants, large plants and full sample of private 
plants) and cooperative utilities. This formulation of the cost 
function eliminates the problem related to the measurement of price 
of capital since does not appear in the cost function.
Results from this model were obtained from maximum likelihood 
estimates of the stochastic frontier short run Cobb-Douglas cost 





Short run Cobb-Douglas cost f u n c t i o n ^  
(asymptotic t-ratlos In parentheses)


















































Short run cost function 
Estimates of ancillary parameters (technical and cost inefficiency 
(asymptotic t-ratlos in parentheses)





























2^The stochastic frontier cost function could not be estimated using 
the data for public utilities because the third moments of OLS 
residuals has wrong sign. Limdep uses the COLS method to generate 
starting values for MLE, and abort when the third moments of OLS has 
the wrong sign.
2^The function could not converge when the stochastic frontier short 
run cost function was estimated using a dummy variable to account for 
vintages on cooperative data set.
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Inefficiency was lowest for small private plants, 4.46%, while 
cooperatives showed a mean inefficiency of 9.21%. No results were 
obtained for public utilities. The cost inefficiency of small 
private plants represented 3.43% of overall costs while cooperative 
firms showed a cost inefficiency of 8.29%. However, large private 
plants are less efficient than small private and cooperatives and 
show a mean inefficiency of 22.13% . Furthermore, calculating the 
confidence interval for each sample, using eq. (5.11), we find 
that the confidence interval for private and cooperative utilities 
are as presented in table 9:
Table 9
Asymptotic confidence interval
private .1381 < Xj < .1879
priv (small) .0246 < < .0603
priv (large) .1494 < Xj < .2932
cooperative .0708 < X^ < .1134
critical value of 1.96
4.3 System of equations
a) Long run production function
Estimating the system of equations (5.6) using maximua likeli­
hood* we obtain the results presented in tables 10 and 11.
For private utilities, the system of equations was estimated 
using the different values of the regulatory constraints for the 
full sample. The regulatory constraint may be especially Important 




System of equations consisting of 
Long run production function, and first order conditions 
























































































































Estimates of ancillary parameters 








































































































type of ownership E(u) E(u)/r E-lnr Total coi 
ineffici*
private (z=0.0) .244 .233 .0413 .2743
private (z=0.2) .243 .233 .0427 .2757
private (z=»0.5) .245 .236 .0400 .2760
private (z=0.8) .269 .264 .0644 .3284
private (small plants) .181 .158 .0441 .2018
private (large plants) .254 .315 .0405 .3560
public .144 .129 .0430 .1720
cooperative .017 .015 .0280 .0430
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Our results Indicate measures of technical inefficiency, for 
full sample of private plants, E(u), ranging from 24.4% to 26.9% 
depending on the value of the regulatory constraint; and, there­
fore, the internal price of capital. Using the formula for computing 
cost of mean inefficiency, E(u)/r (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979, p.355), 
it ranges from 23.3% to 26.42%. Measures of allocative inefficiency, 
E-lnr, where E = c/r*e3 + b/r*e2 + In a + c*exp(-e3) + b*exp(-e2) 
and lnr is the logarithmic value of estimated returns to scale 
(Schmidt and Lovell, 1979, p. 356), ranged from 4.00% to 6.44%. Mean 
technical inefficiency is 18.1% and 25.4% for small and large 
private plants, respectively. Public utilities were found to have 
mean technical inefficiency of 14.4% and mean allocative inefficiency 
of 4.3%. Cooperatives had a 1.7% mean technical inefficiency and a 
2.8% mean allocative inefficiency.
The only estimation of technical and allocative inefficiencies 
using private electric utilities comes from Schmidt and Lovell 
(1979). Estimating a system of equations similar to the system 
presented in eq.(5.6) they report a mean value for E- lnr ■ .081 
which indicates that allocative inefficiency raises cost by 8.1%. 
They show a mean cost technical inefficiency of 8.4% for a total 
cost inefficiency of 16.5%.
Residuals from the cost minimization equations (eq. 5.6), e2 
and 63, can be observed for each observation. They measure allocative 








0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8
of K/L (mean) .038 .082 .043 .509 -.013 -.033
(var) .304 .303 .304 .307 .141 .327
(max) 1.661 1.70 1.66 2.13 .877 1.117
(min) -1.557 -1.51 -1.51 -1.55 -.814 -1.547
of K/F (mean) -.001 .044 .179 .477 .163 .079
(var) .368 .367 .367 .367 .368 .239
(max) 1.570 1.615 1.750 2.048 .999 .792
(min) -1.464 -1.42 -•1.28 -■0.98 -1.166 -2.063
The means of the residuals of e2 and e3 for each ownership structure 
are presented In table 13, along with their variances, and maximum 
and minimum values across all observations. From the means of the 
residuals of K/F and K/L we can establish how far each ownership 
structure Is from using Inputs In the right proportion. Results from 
table 13 Indicate that estimates of the means of e2 and 63 are close 
to zero. It shows only- mild over-capitallzatlon for capital with 
respect to fuel for all ownership types. For example, public utili­
ties use a K/F which is only 16.3% higher than optimal. Private firms 
exhibit over-capitallzatlon with respect to labor also. Moreover, 
public and cooperative firms show over-laborlzation with respect to 
capital. These results differ slightly from Schmidt and Lovell (1979, 
p.360) who find higher and positive over-capitalization with respect 
to both fuel and labor among private firms. They obtained a capi­
tal/fuel ratio that was, on average, 73% higher than the cost 
minimizing ratio while the capital/labor ratio was 36% higher than 
the cost minimizing ratio.
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The results obtained from the system of equations confirmed 
the position of consumer cooperatives as the most efficient ownership 
structures. Publicly-owned utilities come in second followed by the 
private regulated (small or large plants) firms which appear to be 
the least efficient ownership structure. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that most of the total cost of inefficiency is made up of 
technical inefficiency. With respect to private regulated firm, this 
is in contradiction to the general belief that inefficiency is caused 
by rate of return regulation. We do not find the over-capitalization 
with respect to other factors as is predicted by the Averch-Johnson 
effect.
b) Short run production function
Estimating the system of equations presented in eq. (5.9) with 
MLE, where Kq is fixed and is excluded, we obtained the results 
presented in Tables 14 and 15.
The model provides estimates for technical inefficiency as well 
as allocative inefficiency. Once again, private firms (full sample) 
show the highest level of mean technical inefficiency, 24.56Z. 
Cooperative utilities are the most efficient firms with a mean 
technical inefficiency of 6.72Z, as compared to 10.98Z for public 
utilities. When the sample of private plants was divided in large and 
small plants, small private plants indicated a mean technical 
inefficiency of 5.01Z while large private plants showed a mean 
technical inefficiency of 24.89Z. Comparison of cost of mean 
technical inefficiency indicates that small private and cooperatives 
utilities have an almost identical percentage of their total cost due 
to technical inefficiency, that is 6.17Z and 6.37Z respectively.
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Public utilities come behind with 10.26% of their total cost due to 
technical inefficiency.
Table 14 
System of equations 
Short run production function 







fuel labor V log L 













1.149 .0835 -.173 -131.55 
(75.1) (12.1)(-1.23)















.958 .0957 -.024 -94.64 
(46.4) (7.43)
Table 15 
System of equations 
Short run production function 
Estimates of Ancillary parameters 
(Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
type of 
ownership






























24The likelihood function did not converge because of singular Hessian.
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5- Conclusion
A summary of the results obtained from the various stochastic 
models is presented in Table 16. Most estimated models for all 
organizational forms show a substantial level of inefficiency 
which had been expected from the analysis of the attenuation of 
property rights. The second conclusion is the significance of the 
size of plants in explaining inefficiency; almost all models estima­
ted for small and large private plants indicated that measures of 
inefficiency were almost twice as high for large plants compared to 
small plants. As for the conclusions with respect to the most 
efficient type of ownership, the long run models (cost function and 
system of equations) indicate that cooperatives are most efficient 
followed by public utilities and small private utilities. However, 
only the difference between CO vs PU and PR appears to be signifi­
cant. PU and PR do not have significant different mean inefficiency. 
When we consider results from the short run models (cost function and 
system of equations), the short run cost function Indicates that PR 
are most efficient while the short run system of equations shows no 
significant differences between PR and C O.25 Finally, all measurement 
of inefficiency indicate that technical inefficiency is far more 
important than allocative inefficiency. Private firms did not 
show a strong tendancy to over-capitalize with respect to other 
factors of production.
25gesults with respect to efficiency comparison of ownership structure 
should be limited to plants of comparable size, cooperatives, public 
and small private utilities. Results with respect to large plants 
cannot be compared to cooperatives and public plants since we have no 
large plants owned by cooperatives and public utilities.
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Table 16
Summary of the Information on efficiency from various models
cost Inefficiency due to 
technical allocative total
1. Stochastic frontier cost 
function
1.1 Long run cost function
1.1.1 private utilities
a) z = 0.0 17.04%
b) z = 0.2 16.77%
c) z = 0.5 16.39%
d) z m 0.8 18.83%
1.1.2 small private 11.27%
1.1.3 large private 27.25%
1.1.4 public utilities 11.60%
1.1.5 co-op utilities 6.50%
2 Short run cost function
1.2.1 private utilities 11.81%
1.2.2 small private 3.43%
1.2.3 large private 13.36%
1.2.4 public utilities ?
1.2.5 co-op utilities 8.29%
2. system of equations
2.1 Long run stochastic frontier 
production function
2.1.1 private utilities
a) z ■ 0.0 23.30% 4.13% 27.43%
b) z ■ 0.2 23.30% 4.27% 27.57%
c) z - 0.5 23.60% 4.00% 27.60%
d) z = 0.8 26.40% 6.44% 32.84%
2.1.2 small private 15.77% 4.41% 20.18%
2.1.3 large private 31.55% 4.05% 35.60%
2.1.4 public utilities 12.90% 4.30% 17.20%
2.1.5 co-op utilities 1.50% 2.80% 4.30%
2 Short run stochastic frontier
production function
2.2.1 private utilities 26.10%
2.2.2 small private 6.17%
2.2.3 large private 36.49%
2.2.4 public utilities 10.26%
2.2.5 co-op utilities o.37%
SIXTH CHAPTER 
CONCLUSION
This research aims at testing the effects of ownership structure 
on efficiency of various organizational forms: privately-owned 
regulated electric utilities (PR), publicly-owned electric utilities 
(PU) and consumer-owned cooperative electric utilities (CO). A 
comparison of those organizational forms has been conducted on the 
basis of (1) their structure of property rights, (2) their structure 
of incentives, and (3) their structure of enforcement of those 
rights. Property rights are defined with respect to their exclusi­
vity, appropriability, and transferability.
The structure of property rights of PR has been shown to be 
attenuated because of separation of ownership from control, and 
because of regulation. The incentives of the principals, the stock 
holders and the consumers, are affected mostly because of attenuation 
of appropriability and transferability. After rate of regulation is 
effective, stock holders have no further incentives to further 
specialize as monitors. Consumers expect reduce prices from improved 
efficiency but they can appropriate further gains from improved 
efficiency only proportionally to their level of transaction with PR. 
Furthermore, they have no claim over future improvements of PR. They 
are expected to behave as free riders and supply less than optimal 
monitoring activities. Furthermore, neither the financial market nor 
the managerial labor market are expected to produce optimal level of 
monitoring. Politicians are not expected to monitor PR efficiently 
since they are elected every four years and over many issues. Voters
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are expected to shirk their task of being properly informed on 
preferences of politicians as well as on their records with respect 
to efficiency of electric utilities. The regulatory commission has to 
account for consumers as well as stock holders. It is believed that 
it accepts the costs given by managers of electric utilities and add 
to it the appropriate cost of capital. They have to arbitrate 
among various goals, and are subject to lobby on the part of the 
industry.
The property rights structure of PU is attenuated because of 
separation of ownership from control, and because the ownership 
is inherited through residency. Appropriability is limited because 
residents have access to increased efficiency only proportionally to 
their level of transaction with the PU. They have no claim over 
expected future Improvement of the team of production. Transferabili­
ty is limited since residents have no individual claims over the 
assets of the plants. The incentives of the principals, the consumers 
who are residents, are further attenuated because of the free rider 
problem as for consumers of PR. As for PR, the political market is 
not expected to produce optimal level of monitoring with respect to 
efficiency of PU.
All aspects of property rights of CO are also attenuated. Appro­
priability is limited to the level of transaction of each members 
with the CO and by the impossibility of capitalizing expected future 
residuals into present value of the asset of the co-op. However, 
members hold partial claims over the assets of the CO. Transferabili­
ty of those claims is limited since there is no financial market to 
trade them. Members can sell them back to the co-op. Monitoring
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activities will be performed mostly by the board of directors elected 
by the members every year over a single issue: the efficiency of CO. 
Even though members of CO are expected to be more committed to their 
co-op than consumers with respect to PR and PU, they are still 
expected to suffer from the free rider problem. However, the level of 
monitoring of CO is likely to be strongly influenced by the Rural 
Electrification Administration (REA) who finances almost entirely the 
operations of the rural electrical cooperatives. CO have to submit
financial data and other statistics to the REA each month.
Because of the attenuation of the structure of property rights 
for all three organizational forms, we can predict that they will 
show some degree of inefficiency. As for the comparison of efficiency 
between ownership structures, even though we cannot claim to rigou-
rously proove the superiority of property rights of CO over PR and
PU, the structure of incentives and control of CO seems superior 
because of (1) a more direct link with management (homogeneity of 
interest), (2) a more individual ownership claim over the assets, (3) 
a simpler political market, (4) the incentives and control structure 
of REA. The comparison of PR and PU is even more difficult, therefo­
re, we should expect that their measures of efficiency will be 
closely related to each other.
Few research dealing with this issue with respect to electric 
utilities are available. Most of them have tested for efficiency 
comparison using a dummy variable model. Such model shows serious 
limitations since the concept of average function, which is used 
in the dummy variable model, does not represent the most efficient 
technology. The dummy variable measures a combination of random
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shocks, technical and allocative Inefficiencies, and is not capable 
of discriminating among them. No absolute measures of technical 
and allocative inefficiencies can be obtained from such model. An 
other research using a non-frontier estimation technique attempts 
to compare efficiency of public and private electric utilities, 
but such methodology is limited since no measure of technical 
efficiency is obtained. Furthermore, it is plagued with contra­
dictions and does not fully account for technology differences 
among ownership types. Therefore, little is known on the issue 
under investigation in this research, and much remains to be done.
The choice of an appropriate methodology is crucial to conduct a 
comparative analysis of efficiency differences between organizational 
forms. Several models are available to measure efficiency of firms: 
(1) deterministic non parametric model, (2) deterministic parametric 
model, (3) deterministic statistical frontier model, (4) stochastic 
frontier model, (5) non frontier efficiency models, (6) total factor 
productivity model, (7) dummy variable model. The stochastic frontier 
model has been selected. When compared to other models the stochastic 
frontier model offers several advantages:
(a) it allows an unlimited number of observations to be technic­
ally efficient,
(b) it is not sensitive to outliers,
(c) random shocks, statistical noise, and measurement errors are 
not confused with measurement of technical efficiency,
(d) the stochastic frontier model permits measurement of tech­
nical and allocative efficiency separately, and these estimates 
have testable, statistical properties,
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(e) Che concept of stochastic frontier represents the theorical 
concept of most efficient technology,
(f) it solves the bounded range problem of the deterministic 
statistical model.
The weaknesses of the stochastic frontier model are:
(a) it is limited in the selection of functional form since the 
production function must be homothetic,
(b) it has no a priori good argument to select a distribution 
for the disturbance term.
The essential idea, behind the stochastic frontier model is that 
the error term is composed of two parts: a symmetric component that 
permits random variation of the frontier across firms, and captures 
the effect of measurement error, other statistical noise, and random 
shocks outside the control of the firm; and a one-sided component 
which captures the effect of inefficiency relative to the stochastic 
frontier. This is represented by y-f(x)-(u+v) where v is the symme­
tric component and u the one-sided component, u>0, and represents the 
absolute measure of technical inefficiency. Measures of allocative 
efficiency can be obtained from the residual of the first order 
conditions from cost minimization.
After choosing the stochastic frontier model to measure efficien­
cy, we need to select a proper functional form; for this research we 
have selected a Cobb-Douglas function. The estimation of a stochastic 
frontier Cobb-Douglas function (production and/or cost) provides all 
the required information to measure, and therefore compare among 
various organizational forms, absolute technical and allocative 
inefficiencies. Moreover, it does not create critical distortions in
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the estimated results of technical and allocative efficiencies. 
Finally, a Cobb-Douglas function captures the critical characteris­
tics of the technology of electricity generation.
The complete model requires that we select a proper objective 
function to characterize the behavior of the firm. This is an 
important task since measurement of inefficiencies depends on a 
standard of comparison which is derived from our behavioral hypothe­
ses with regard to each ownership structure. In the electric utili­
ties, the literature strongly suggests that output and the prices it 
pays for inputs are exogenous to the firm. Therefore, electric 
utilities are expected to behave as cost minimizers. The arguments 
presented to justify cost minimization for private utilities can 
apply to public as well as cooperative utilities.
From the stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas production function 
and the objective function of cost minimization, we can derive 
the models to be estimated: (1) a stochastic frontier C-D long
run cost function, (2) a stochastic frontier C-D short run cost 
function, (3) a system of equations comprised of a stochastic 
frontier C-D long run production function and the first order 
conditions derived from the cost minimizing Lagrangian, (4) a 
system of equations comprised of a stochastic frontier C-D short 
run production function and the first order conditions derived 
from the cost minimizing Lagrangian. The estimation of those models 
is done through MLE using numerical techniques and Davidon-Fletcher- 
Powe11. The ML estimation requires a proper likelihood function which 
is derived from an hypothesis with respect to the density function of 
u, v and e^ (residuals from the first order conditions).
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Those models have been estimated using data from the steam 
electric generation in the U.S.. This industry shows interesting 
characteristics: (1) three different ownership structures are
generating electricity using the same technology; (2) standardized 
data for all three types of firms are available; (3) technology of 
steam-electric utilities has been studied for over 25 years. The data 
are measured at the plant level, and are from the first full year of 
operation through the fifth year.
Results from the estimation of the models presented earlier 
indicate that:
(a) all three types of ownership structures suffer from some 
degree of inefficiencies,
(b) estimations of long run models (cost function and system of 
equations) rank cooperative utilities as the most efficient 
ownership structure; the difference between CO vs PR and PU is 
important and statistically significant. Moreover, measures of 
inefficiencies of PU and PR are not significantly different.
(c) estimations of short run models (cost function and system of 
equations) produce ambiguous results; the stochastic frontier 
short run cost function puts the PR as the most efficient 
ownership structure while the system of equations shows 
identical inefficiency measurement for both Pr and CO. PU shows 
the highest level of inefficiency.
(d) total inefficiency is composed mostly of technical ineffic­
iency. All types of firms show a small level of allocative 
inefficiency, including privately-owned regulated electric
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utilities. Therefore, private firms did not show a strong 
tendancy to over-capitalize.
(e) all comparison between those three types of ownership 
structures have been done for comparable size of plants. When 
efficiency measurement is compared for small and large plants, 
inefficiency of large plants nearly doubles compared to 
inefficiency of small plants (this comparison has been done 
only for PR since CO and PU did not have large plants).
This research has proven to be fruitful in that it lends to 
further support to the hypothesis derived from the property rights 
theory to the effect that a specific reward system is needed to 
stimulate a particular productivity response. Attenuation of property 
rights allows further discretionary behavior on the parts of the 
agents against the best interests of the principals. Such discretion­
ary behavior is translated mostly in terms of overutilization of all 
resources contrary to the general belief built on the Averch-Johnson 
effect. Our analysis of the property rights structure of PR, PU and 
CO had lead to the weak conclusion that CO would be expected to be 
more efficient than PR and PU. Even though all models do not generate 
such conclusion, the overall performance of CO with respect to 
efficiency measurement put them first followed by PR and PU which 
cannot be significantly distinguished.
Such results can have important policy implications since all 
three types of ownership structures are the results of direct 
government interventions: (1) regulation of private utilities, (2) 
direct investment of government in the electric utility industry, (3) 
rural electrification program supervised by REA. It would appear that
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both programs of regulation and direct Investment produce similar 
results In terms of Inefficiency. From a policy point of view, it Is 
therefore difficult to recommand one over the other. However, the 
rural electrification appears to have been a success from the 
efficiency point of view. Regulators have been more concerned with 
proper level of price of capital over the years, but our results 
strongly suggest that they should be much more concerned with 
technical inefficiency than allocative inefficiency. That conclusion 
implies a different philosophy with respect to regulation and should 
lead to further Investigations. Finally, the strong efficiency 
difference between small and large plants (nearly twice as much for 
large plants) should be a major concern for regulators.
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